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Abstract
This thesis conducts an empirical analysis which explores the impact of parental in-
vestment, birth control policy and higher education expansion reform on individuals’
education attainments and labour market outcomes in China. The thesis includes
three substantive chapters.
Firstly, Chapter 3 presents new evidence on the child quantity-quality (Q-Q)
trade-off in China. The primary contribution is the use of a new instrumental
variable (IV) for fertility, i.e., local policy relaxation regarding Chinese birth control,
in order to establish the causal effect of family size on child educational attainments
and health outcomes. The aim is to examine whether having more children in
a family has a negative impact on child quality, and if the higher education of
parents and a larger household income have a positive impact on child outcomes.
Additionally, this estimation can check the effectiveness of the one-child policy. The
findings indicate that there is a negative effect of fertility on education outcome,
and support the prediction made by the Becker and Lewis’ model regarding the
Q-Q trade-off for children. However, there is no evidence for health outcome.
Secondly, Chapter 4 studies the role of higher education expansion policy in in-
creasing the equality of higher education opportunities. In 1999, government rapidly
expanded the number of higher education places available. The goal of this chapter
is to explore the impact of family background and gender on access to higher edu-
cation, prior to and following the higher education expansion policy. The analysis
is based on nationally representative data from the Chinese Family Panel Stud-
iii
ies (CFPS), collected in 2010. Cohort-level analysis and a difference-in-difference
model were used to estimate how the benefits of the education expansion were dis-
tributed. The results show that higher education expansion has not been equally
distributed among people from richer and poorer backgrounds. The education of
parents remains a strong determinant of educational outcomes among children fol-
lowing education reform. Despite the benefits brought on by the expansion system,
such as more opportunities for accessing tertiary education, these benefits have not
been distributed evenly among families, geographies or gender. The equality of
higher education opportunities remains a difficult task.
Finally, Chapter 5 examines the causal impact of higher education expansion
policy on labour market outcomes for young college graduates. Large pooled cross-
sectional datasets were used from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP)
between 1995 and 2013. First, the Mincer-style of returns to education for young
cohorts were estimated in the 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 survey years. The aim
was to compare the extent of returns to education among the pre-expansion cohort
and the post-expansion cohort, and evidence is found a significant decrease in the
returns to higher education of young cohorts. Second, another approach quantifies
the effects of education expansion on labour market outcomes and identifies the
distribution of returns to education by exploring a natural experiment. This study
exploited variation in the intensity of expansion in college numbers across provinces
and applied a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect of the education
reform. The results of the study also illustrate expansion has a negative effect on
college graduates’ returns and labour market outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In modern society, family background plays an essential role in shaping children’s
educational experiences and achievements and the successful transmission of the par-
ents’ socioeconomic status to the economic outcomes of their children (Buchmann,
2002; Checchi, 2006; Bjo¨rklund et al., 2011). This strong association of socioeco-
nomic outcomes across generations is indicative of a low level of intergenerational
mobility. If children’s outcomes as adults strongly rely on their family backgrounds,
this implies that it is hard for individuals from disadvantaged families to escape
their social class. The topic of inequality across generations has arisen frequently in
policy debates and many social policymakers have adopted policies that are aimed at
reducing the impact a family background has on children’s educational attainments
and labour market outcomes.
This thesis aims to analyse the effects of such policies on individuals’ schooling
opportunities and returns to education. Analysis is presented in chapter 3, 4 and 5.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide evidence of the effect of both the one-child policy and the
higher education expansion policy on children’s educational opportunities. Chapter
5 examines the causal impact of the expansion of higher education on labour market
outcomes. First it is necessary to provide information on the background of this
thesis, as well as its motivation and structure.
1
1.1 Background
From a global perspective, world-level educational achievements have grown rapidly.
The general rise in access to schooling has reduced disparities both between and
within countries (Checchi, 2006). Investment in human capital is necessary in order
to achieve sustainable economic and technological development for a country in the
long run. Education is widely considered to be an effective mechanism with which to
increase intergenerational mobility and social fluidity. Higher educational achieve-
ment not only improves quality of life and gives people a better understanding of the
world, but also advances social, economic, and technological developments (Ozturk,
2001). Therefore, education is one of the basic and essential factors denoting devel-
opment within a society. This section presents the research background from three
aspects: economic development, educational structure and reforms, and historical
context in China.
Over the past decades China, the world’s most populous country, has experi-
enced impressive economic development since its market-oriented reform in 1978. It
has achieved an average of 8.6 percent annual GDP growth over the period between
1978 and 2007. Moreover, the national living standards in China have increased
twelvefold over these decades (Gong et al., 2012). This fast economic growth has
been accompanied by social transformations (Zhu, 2012). The growth has been con-
tributed to by an accumulation of human capital and market-oriented institutional
reforms. This economic reform was initiated in the late 1970s by adjusting the
incentive structure in the agricultural sector, enhancing agricultural productivity,
and generating a surplus of rural labour (Rozelle et al., 1997). At the same time,
China adopted the economic reform in the early 1990s that generated a high de-
mand for a labour force in urban areas. The Chinese Government started reforming
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and encouraged diversification of ownership. This
market-oriented privatisation resulted in a flexible labour market and promoted eco-
nomic growth (Dong and Xu, 2009).
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Along with one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world, the rising
level of inequality in China during this period is also striking. The Gini coefficient,
an indicator of inequality, rocketed from 0.33 to 0.45 between 1980 and 2010. This
rate of increase, according to the World Bank, was in relative terms the fastest in the
world. The cross-sectional inequality in China has been investigated by several re-
searchers (Ge and Yang, 2014; Fan and Sun, 2008). Inequality is particularly evident
in the rural-urban gap and in regional disparities. Widening regional gaps between
the rural and urban areas have induced massive migration from the countryside to
the city. Moreover, enormous spatial disparities exist in terms of the distribution of
economic activities, natural resources, local market institutions, local government
policies and other determinants of income levels and economic growth. Numerous
empirical studies have been undertaken with the aim of examining the inequality
across regions from different perspectives in China (Zhang et al., 2012).
Education is a significant indicator of socioeconomic status. China’s economic
growth has also benefited from its large stock of graduates from higher education
institutions, creating a medium- and high-skilled labour force (Heckman and Yi,
2012). The increase in returns to education has stimulated both the family and
the Government to invest in children’s education. There have been a number of
major educational reforms, aimed at the pursuit of a universal access to basic edu-
cation. In 1986, the Compulsory Education Law was implemented, which includes
nine years of compulsory education (six years at primary school plus three years at
junior secondary school). The implementation occurred gradually and differentially,
depending on the level of local capacity (Hannum et al., 2009).
In the late 1990s and 2000s, the Chinese Government adopted a series of educa-
tional polices aimed at expanding compulsory education, especially in rural areas,
and also increasing both senior middle school and higher education enrolments. In
the early 2000s, the Government improved central funding, providing assistance to
support compulsory education in rural areas and reducing the cost of education that
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was borne by rural households (Hannum et al., 2009). In 2003, the Central Gov-
ernment announced the education policy for compulsory schooling, under which the
Government would pay school fees and the costs of textbooks and provide subsidies
for boarding. The policy was initially aimed at supporting and encouraging poor
families to invest in education in rural areas. In 2006, the Government announced
that it would provide central budgetary funding to eliminate all tuition fees for stu-
dents in the first nine compulsory years of schooling. This reduced the educational
cost for households and encouraged further investment in their children’s education.
These education policies were accompanied by substantial growth in the progres-
sion rates to junior and senior secondary school. The enrolment rate was already at
98% in 1990. The progression rate from primary school to junior middle school (that
is, the ratio of junior middle school enrolments out of the primary school graduates)
surpassed 90% in 1995, further increasing to 95% in 2000 and nearly 100% in 2005.
The progression rate—from junior to senior middle school—also increased substan-
tially, from 45% in the early 1990s to over 80% in 2008 (NBS, 2009). Moreover, the
completion rate of both primary and junior middle schooling was higher than that
in other Asian countries (Becker, 2012).
As well as the polices for compulsory education, China has also undergone trans-
formational tertiary education reforms during the past 30 years. Higher education
plays a considerable role in the prosperity of individuals and of entire nations. For in-
dividuals, higher educational attainments may increase the likelihood of significantly
higher income and an upward move through social classes. For countries, widening
participation in tertiary education may lead to technological developments and in-
creased national productivity. The Chinese Government proposed to expand college
enrolment and to develop world-class universities in response to the significant de-
mand for highly skilled workers and higher education graduates. The progression
rate to tertiary schooling (from senior secondary school) rose dramatically in China,
from less than 30% in the early 1990s to over 70% in the mid-2000s. Educational
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expansion is regarded as one of the most important considerations when promoting
economic growth, as it provides more skilled labour to meet social, economic and
technological developments.
However, the transformational potential of these eduction reforms are influenced
by China’s unique household registration (hukou) system. Before the economic re-
form in 1978, labour mobility between rural and urban areas was essentially not
allowed. Individuals born in rural areas received “agricultural hukou”, while those
born in urban areas received “non-agricultural hukou”. This geographic restriction
of labour mobility, which applied not only to movements from rural to urban areas,
but also from small urban cities to large urban cities, effectively reduced intergener-
ational mobility (Wu and Xie, 2003). After the 1978 economic reform, China started
to experience economic developments and a strong demand for labour forces. As
a result, the Chinese Government began to gradually relax its strict registration
system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Those residing in rural areas gained the
opportunity to work in the cities and so to provide a better environment for their
children. Consequently, a steady increase in geographic mobility boosted intergen-
erational mobility across China.
In traditional Chinese society, there is a strong relationship between parents and
children. Family plays a significant role in an individual’s life. In 1978, China (as
the world’s most populous country) introduced a family planning policy aimed at
limiting family size and potentially having a positive effect on the quality of children.
In the early 1970s, after two decades of rapid population growth in China, policy
makers formulated a series of policies to control population increases. In order
to slow down fast population growth, the Chinese central government enacted its
birth planning campaign in 1971. Later, it was substituted by straightly controlling
the number of children per family. The one-child policy, which was much stricter,
was formally announced and enforced across the country in 1979. Each family was
permitted to only have one child. Due to the difficulties in enforcing the one-child
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policy, particularly in rural areas, the policy was relaxed as early as 1984. The main
relaxation was named the “1-son- 2-child” rule. It states that rural couples were
allowed to have a second birth if the first child was a girl.
Chinese families preferred to invest in sons, rather than daughters (Deutsch,
2006). Parents usually invested a large proportion of their income and assets in
their children’s education and further career development. Typically, adult children
live with their parents until marriage, and sometimes after. The parents, as well
as the grandparents, are known to invest considerable time and resources into the
development of their offspring. In return, parents expect their children to support
them in their old age.
1.2 Motivation and Aims
The main aim of this thesis is to examine individuals’ educational attainments and
labour market outcomes as a result of a series of economic and educational policies
in China. The government implemented these policies with the goal of alleviating
inequality and improving people’s living standards. Therefore, it is important to
analyse whether these policies have given everyone equal opportunities to live better
and to obtain a good degree, or whether they have simply reproduced the existing
inequality.
Another motivation, from the perspective of economic and educational reforms,
is to understand whether everyone has the possibility to live a life independent of
their initial condition. In many and diverse countries, the parents’ socioeconomics
status has been found to be a powerful positive determinant of their children’s
outcomes (Waanders et al., 2007), thus reducing the extent of household intergen-
erational mobility should be a target for government and policy-makers. According
to Thirlwall’s Growth and development (2006), many developing countries have a
very unequal distribution of income and wealth, and an unequal opportunity for
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education—much more so than that of their developed counterparts. Moreover, the
growth and development that take place may benefit only the richest few, while the
vast majority of the population are excluded from receiving a share of their coun-
try’s achievements. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse whether resources can in
fact be distributed equally to different people and families.
The connection between intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity
means that the extent of the correlation between the status of parents and that of
their children is a topic of strong interest to policymakers. Education becomes of
particular interest as it could be a promoter of, or a barrier to, the enhancement
of socio-economic mobility in society. The first two main chapters of this thesis
present an analysis of the effect of the one-child policy and the higher education
expansion policy on individuals’ educational opportunities and inequality. Chapter
3 investigates the causal effects of family size on children’s outcomes where family
size varies due to the one-child policy. This study has provided new evidence for
testing the existence of child quantity-quality trade-off. Chapter 4 examines the
distributed consequences of the higher education expansion in 1999 and the impact
of diverse family backgrounds on college opportunities. The results indicate that
the higher education expansion policy is beneficial for the children with more highly
schooled parents.
Finally, this research also proposes to answer the question of whether or not a
higher education degree improves an individual’s returns and labour market out-
comes. Even though the issue of a worsening labour market for college graduates
has raised concerns, there is little empirical research addressing the impacts of the
higher education expansion policy on labor market outcomes of college graduates.
Understanding the impacts is necessary to evaluate policy effectiveness, and is help-
ful for policy makers to improve future education policy. Consequently, Chapter 5
examines the causal impact of the higher education expansion policy on the labour
market. The results illustrate the policy has negative effect on individuals’ returns.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
This section describes the organisation of the thesis by outlining the research ques-
tions that will be addressed in the following chapters. The thesis is divided into six
chapters.
The literature review presented in Chapter 2, aims to provide an overview of the
theory used in analysing the policy effects on individuals’ education attainments and
labour market outcomes. The first part reviews theories of Becker-Tomes quantity-
quality models, focusing on family size on children’s outcomes as adults. The sec-
ond part reviews the relevant literature on the association between education and
economic development. The last two parts discuss intergenerational income and ed-
ucational mobility and returns to education related to higher education expansion
reform.
This thesis seeks to answer the following research questions: 1) Is there any
effect of family size on children’s outcomes; 2) Has the one-child policy increased the
quality of children as adults; 3) Does parents’ education level affect the educational
choices of children; 4) What is the extent of intergenerational mobility in educational
outcomes and 5) How such mobility has changed over birth cohorts across different
policy environments; 6) Does the expansion of higher education increase the equality
of educational opportunities; 7) What are the changes in returns to education before
and after the education policy; 8) What are the quantified impacts of the 1999 higher
education expansion on the labour market outcomes of college graduates.
The first two questions are addressed in Chapter 3, which presents new evidence
on the child quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off in China. The one-child policy was
announced in 1979 in order to curb the country’s explosive population growth and
increase child welfare. Each family was permitted to only have one child, another
child was allowed only under exceptional circumstances. After four years of strict
control, in 1984, local governments introduced a more relaxed policy to allow for a
second child for rural citizens if the first child was a girl.
8
The main contribution of this chapter is to establish the causal effect of family
size on the quality of children. Second, we use panel data to analyse a longer time
period from 1989 to 2011. The third is the use of a new instrumental variable
(IV) for fertility—local policy relaxation under Chinese birth control. Relaxation
is used as an instrumental variable for the family size in this chapter. Qian (2006)
is one of the first to use the relaxation as an instrument for fertility. She uses
exogenous variation in family size caused by this relaxation to evaluate the causal
effect of family size on school enrolment and finds an additional sibling increases
school enrolment of the first child by 8-17%. Her sample is restricted to the first
child in cohorts born during 1972-1981. Moreover the dependent variable “health” is
added as an additional outcome dimension in addition to child school enrolment and
education level, as health has received very little attention in the previous empirical
studies. Our findings indicate that family size has a strong effect on improving
children’s completed years of schooling. However, there is no evidence for the Q-Q
trade-off when using health as the measure of child quality. One of the reasons is
that a lack of nutrition is not a significant concern in China. Consequently, from
this evidence, the existence of Q-Q trade-off is sensitive to the measure variable of
quality.
Question 3, 4, 5 and 6 are considered in Chapter 4, which examines the role of
the higher education expansion policy in increasing the equality of higher education
opportunities. Since the implementation of the expansion plan in September 1999,
the rate of new students entering tertiary education and college graduates kept ris-
ing dramatically. China has experienced higher education expansion reform, with
the number of new college students rising from 1.08 million in 1998 to 6.62 million
in 2010. The initial goal of the college expansion reform was to increase the edu-
cational opportunities for children from poor areas or less well educated families.
Social researchers and policy makers are concerned about whether this expansion
has worked as a great “equaliser” by providing more upward mobility opportunities
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for the young generation who had been more disadvantaged before the reform or has
exacerbated inequality by improving access to higher education disproportionately
for those who are already privileged.
The aim of Chapter 4 is to explore the impact of family background and gender
on access to higher education, prior to and following the higher education expansion
policy. Analysis is based on nationally representative data from the Chinese Family
Panel Studies (CFPS), collected in 2010. Cohort-level analysis and a difference-
in-difference model are used to estimate how the benefits of the higher education
expansion were distributed. The results show that higher education expansion has
not been equally distributed among people from richer and poorer backgrounds. The
education of parents remains a strong determinant of educational outcomes among
children following the education expansion reform. The higher education expansion
leads to more persistent intergenerational immobility. With the increasing number of
colleges and universities, parental educational background still has a strong impact
on children’s higher education opportunities. This indicates that the expansion
policy is beneficial for the students with more highly schooled parents. Despite
the benefits brought on by the expansion system, such as more opportunities for
accessing tertiary education, these benefits have not been distributed evenly among
families, geographies or gender. The equality of higher education opportunities
remains a difficult task.
The final two questions are addressed in Chapter 5, which examines the causal
impact of higher education expansion policy on labour market outcomes for young
college graduates. It is necessary to consider whether the increased supply of higher
education graduates has changed labour market outcomes and how this sharp in-
crease in the supply of college graduates affected the college wage premium for
affected cohorts. Large pooled cross-sectional datasets are used from the Chinese
Household Income Project (CHIP) between 1995 and 2013. First, the Mincer-type
rates of returns to education for young cohorts were estimated in the 1995, 2002,
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2007 and 2013 survey years. In a seminal contribution to understanding the rela-
tionship between education and earnings, Mincer (1974) presented a human capital
framework of education and earnings determination, spawning a large amount of lit-
erature in which the natural logarithm of individual earnings—measured as hourly,
monthly, or annual wages—is an additive function of education, which is in years of
schooling or attainment of a high school diploma or college degree, work experience,
and other factors.
This study aimed to compare the extent of returns to education among the pre-
expansion cohort and the post-expansion cohort and found evidence supporting a
significant decrease in the returns to higher education of young cohorts. Second,
cohort-level analysis and a difference-in-difference model are used to quantify the ef-
fects of education expansion on labour market outcomes. The difference-in-difference
model identifies the distribution of returns to education by exploring a natural ex-
periment. It exploited variation in the intensity of expansion in college numbers
across provinces, and applied a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect
of the education reform. The results illustrate expansion has a negative effect on
college graduates’ returns and labour market outcomes.
Chapter 6 is the concluding part of this thesis. It summarises the main findings
of this analysis, discussing the contributions to knowledge of this thesis in both
theoretical perspectives and policy terms. This chapter also considers the limitations
of this study and suggests scope of future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter includes a review of the theoretical and empirical literatures from
several aspects. The first part reviews theories of Becker-Tomes’ quantity-quality
models, focusing on family effects on children’s outcomes as adults. The second part
reviews the relevant literature on the association between education and economic
development. The third part discusses intergenerational mobility from income and
educational perspectives. Finally, the last part reviews the theory of returns to
education which related to higher education expansion reform.
2.1 Quantity and Quality Trade-off Models
Before Gary Becker’s Quantity-Quality (Q-Q) tradeoff theory, fertility choice was
widely regarded to be outside the realm of economic analysis. Doepke (2015) reviews
Becker’s contributions to the economics analysis of fertility. The main details are
as follows. Becker’s initial paper (Becker, 1960) focused on the theory of fertility
choice which viewed children as consumer durables. The earliest Q-Q tradeoff model
was introduced to observe the empirical relationship between income and fertility.
In his 1960s’ paper, Becker surmised that parents derive utility from both child
quantity and the quality of children, where quality can be proxied by the amount
spent on each child at given prices. As examples of child quality concepts, Becker
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noted whether parents provide “separate bedrooms, send them to nursery school
and private colleges, give them dance and music lessons, and so forth” to their
children. Becker argued for a low income elasticity of child quantity and a high
income elasticity of child quality. This means that richer families do not purchase
a large number of durable children, but instead go for higher quality. As well as
household income and the cost of children, Becker considered knowledge of birth
control as a possible determinant of fertility.
Becker and Lewis (1973)’s main contribution is that although child quantity
and quality come into the utility function separately, they are still closely connected
through the household’s budget constraints. The simple utility function is as follows:
U = U(n, q, y) (2.1)
where U is the utility function, n is the number of children, q is the average quality
of children, and y is the rate of other consumption. The budget constraint which
connects quantity and quality is:
I = nqc+ ycy (2.2)
where I is the income, c is the price of nq, and cy is the price of y. The first-order
conditions for maximising the utility function to the budget restraint are:
MUn = aqc = apn (2.3)
MUq = anc = apq (2.4)
MUy = acy = apy (2.5)
where the MU’s are the marginal utilities, p’s are marginal costs, and a is the
marginal utility of income. The equations indicate that if quality of the child in-
creases when parents have more spending per child, raising quantity (more children),
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becomes more expensive. Conversely, if quantity rises, increasing quality also be-
comes more costly, because the spending on quality accumulates for each child. This
also explains the reason why we observe the income elasticity of demand for quality
of children is high while the quantity elasticity is low and often even negative.
Becker and Tomes (1976) extended the Becker-Lewis’ Q-Q tradeoff model by
allowing child quality to rely on not just parental investment, but also on “endow-
ments” which can take the form of other factors, such as inherited ability, public
investments and effects. One consequence of the existence of endowments is that
the income elasticity of child quality tends to be higher in low income households.
They reveal that this feature can generate a U-shape and discuss the theory that
child endowments depend on parental income. Therefore, the measure of income
becomes:
R = npn + qpq + ypy = I + nqc (2.6)
It is well known that the mean value of the true income elasticities is unity. There-
fore, the equation becomes:
1 =
npn
R
ηn +
qpq
R
ηq +
ypy
R
ηy (2.7)
Combine the Equation 2.6 and Equation 2.8,
1 >
I
R
=
I
I + nqc
=
npn
R
ηn +
qpq
R
ηq +
ypy
R
ηy (2.8)
Becker and Barro (1986) analyse fertility within a model about intergenera-
tional mobility in which parents derive utility from the number of children and their
children’s utility. Therefore, child quality is no longer an abstract good related
to spending on children, but consists of the children’s wellbeing itself. Moreover,
Becker et al. (1990) link the dynastic fertility model with the impact of economic
growth.
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Motivated by the above theoretical model of the Q-Q, the relationship between
family size and child outcome has been analysed empirically. Under the general
assumption that parents invest in the children equally, the model predicts that
an exogenous increase in the number of children increases the marginal cost of
investment in their quality. We assume that schooling is explained by variation in
parental investment. The probability of entering school can be modelled as a linear
function:
P (Ei | ri, Xi) = α0 + α1ri + α2Xi (2.9)
where r is the resources for children, Xi is a vector of other variables. Ei is the
educational status of children. The Q-Q theory persists a negative relationship
between family sizes and child resources. The association is as follows:
ri = β1ni + β2mi (2.10)
where ni is the number of children in household, mi represents family background,
including wealth, income or education. Combine the above two equations, the fol-
lowing reduced form linear function is
P (Ei | ni, Xi) = γ0 + γ1ni + γ2Xi (2.11)
which is the empirical strategy for Q-Q tradeoff theory. If the empirical results are
consistent with Becker’s results, γ1 is less than 0.
The Q-Q model has been the dominant theoretical framework in the economics of
fertility over the past 50 years. Several methodologies have been used to test the Q-Q
trade-off model using instrumental variables to identify exogenous variation (Black
et al., 2004; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Angrist et al., 2010). In the contemporary
society, a number of studies have concentrated on the empirical relevance of the
Q-Q tradeoff in industrialised countries. Numerous empirical studies have found
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a negative relationship between family size and child schooling years in different
countries and support for the Q-Q trade-off (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Conley
and Glauber, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). Other studies,
however, imply that children’s outcomes are not significantly affected by the number
of children, and hence conclude that there is no evidence for Q-Q trade-off (Black
et al., 2004; Angrist et al., 2010).
To establishing the causal relationship of quantity and quality of children, some
studies have exploited the variation in the number of children caused by exogenous
factors, such as twins (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Black et al., 2004), the sex
composition of the first two children (Angrist et al., 2010; Conley and Glauber, 2006),
and multiple births of the second or third child (Angrist et al., 2010). In this thesis,
according to Becker’s theories, the first empirical chapter which is Chapter 3 presents
new evidence–local policy relaxation under the one-child policy as a instrumental
variable–for testing the existence of the child Q-Q trade-off in China.
2.2 Education and Theory of Economic Growth
Education has been considered as an essential determinant of economic development.
The theoretical growth literature emphasises at least three mechanisms through
which education may affect economic growth. First, schooling can increase the
human capital inherent in the labour force, which raises labour productivity and
hence transitional growth toward a higher equilibrium level of output (Mankiw et al.,
1992). Second, education can expand the innovative capacity of the economy, and
the new information on improved products, technologies, and processes promotes
growth (Lucas, 1998; Aghion et al., 1998). Third, education can promote the spread
and transmission of knowledge needed to understand and process new information
and to implement new technologies devised by others, which also promotes economic
development (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994).
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The simple framework in which to examine the effects of eduction on economic
development is offered by the growth accounting model. The fundamental framework
is that output is a function of factor inputs.
Y = AF (K,L) (2.12)
There are two inputs, L, labour, and K, capItal, with only one aggregate output, Y.
Differentiating the above equation with respect to time
Y˙
Y
= FK
K
Y
K˙
K
+ FL
L
Y
L˙
L
+
A˙
A
(2.13)
If the factors of production are rewarded by their marginal products, then
FK(K/Y ) is the share of profits in the economy and FL(L/Y ) is the share of labour.
With a production function these shares sum to one, so that, if we denote FK(K/Y )
is equal to α then FL(L/Y ) is equal to 1 − α. The production function is Cobb-
Douglas. These assumptions imply
Y˙
Y
= α
K˙
K
+ (1− α)L˙
L
+
A˙
A
(2.14)
Consequently, there are different types of labour indexed by years of education.
Lt is the input of labour with t years of education.
L = L(L0, L1, ...LT ) (2.15)
This section reviews the theoretical literatures on the relationship between edu-
cation and economic development. Education can be viewed as a significant factor
of economic development. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend the situation of
education in a country. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examines the development of edu-
cation and inequality on intergenerational mobility and the labour market outcomes
under the higher education polices.
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2.3 Intergenerational Mobility
The original paper on intergenerational mobility of income is Becker and Tomes
(1979), who formulate the concept of intergenerational elasticity of income. Their
later research (Becker and Tomes, 1986) develops the model for the transmission of
income, linking family background into the analysis of economic development. Other
cornerstone papers from Solon (1999, 2004) rationalise the log-linear regression to
examine the association between the income of parents and their children which is
widely used in empirical work.
Studies of intergenerational mobility generally estimate the association between
the socioeconomic status of parents and economic outcomes of their offsprings as
adults. If an individual’s income is strongly related to his or her parents’ income,
this indicates a child from a poor family has limited opportunities to escape his or
her start status of life; inequality persists. The standard intergenerational mobility
model that is estimated is
lnY childi = β0 + β1lnY
parents
i + βXZi + ui (2.16)
where lnYchildi is the log of a measure of children’s earnings as adults, and lnY
parents
i
is the log of income for parents. Zi is a vector of the control variables, including
children’s age, gender, parents’ age, urban/rural, and ui is the error term. β1 is the
elasticity of children’s income with respect to their parents’ income and (1-β1) can
be regarded as measuring intergenerational mobility.
If β1=0, it is the complete mobility where the incomes of parents are completely
unrelated with children’s incomes. If β1=1, it indicates a situation of complete im-
mobility where the proportionate earnings advantage of parents is precisely inherited
by their children’s generation. If β1 is more than 1, it means that the effect of par-
ents’ income is huge in the children’s generation. In general, β1 lies between 0 and 1,
indicating that an initial income advantage will be wiped out over two generations.
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If this coefficient is less than others, it suggests there is more intergenerational mo-
bility. This has implications for economic efficiency if the intelligent and diligent
individuals from poorer families are under-developed or not fully utilised, as those
from disadvantaged backgrounds will not achieve to their productive potential.
The intergenerational income correlation is considered as a measure of “standard-
ised persistence”, where SDlnY
parents
and SDlnY
children
are the standard deviation of
parental and children’s income, respectively.
Intergenerational income correlationρ = β1 ∗ (SDlnY parents/SDlnY children) (2.17)
Most of the early research concentrates on estimation of income correlation be-
tween father and son in developed countries, especially in the US. Bjorklund and
Jantti (1997) compare the intergenerational mobility of income in Sweden and the
US and find that intergenerational mobility in Sweden is higher than in the US.
Their later work (Bjorklund et al., 2002) which extended the comparison to more
countries, confirmed their original finding. Moreover, Couch and Dunn (1997) es-
timate intergenerational mobility of earnings in Germany. The intergenerational
elasticity of income between fathers and sons is relatively low.
In addition to the literature concerning intergenerational income mobility, stud-
ies on intergenerational educational mobility have also been conducted. Chapter 4
analyses the changes on intergenerational mobility in education. The literature has
shown that parents’ education is significant in predicting children’s achievement.
Educational decisions on children are determined by parental preference and finan-
cial conditions (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Becker et al., 1990). Hertz et al. (2008)
provide comparable estimations based on an analysis of national household surveys
in 42 countries during the 50-year period. Specifically, they report the estimated
coefficients from simple regressions of a child’s schooling years on the parents’ av-
erage schooling years; they also inform correlation coefficients between those two
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variables. Moreover, they report both the regression coefficients and the correla-
tions for all ages pooled and for five-year birth cohorts. For most countries, the
regression coefficient falls over time. In contrast, the correlation coefficients display
no significant time trend.
Several researchers, such as Hertz et al. (2008) have examined the effect of the
average years of parents’ education level on children’s schooling years. Others have
distinguished the effects of father’s and mother’s education on the son’s and daugh-
ter’s education. Based on this literature, it is possible to regress the equation which
has children’s schooling years on their parents’ education to explore the intergener-
ational educational mobility. The standard regression model can be written as:
edchildi = α0 + α1ed
parents
i + αXZi + ξi (2.18)
where edchildi is the schooling years of the children, ed
parents
i is the schooling years of
their parents, Zi is a vector of the control variables, including children’s age, gender,
parents’ age, urban/rural. α1 picks up the education association across generations.
Hertz et al. (2008) also examine the intergenerational education correlation.
They refer to the regression coefficient as measures of “grade persistence”, and the
correlations as measures of “standardised persistence”.
Intergenerational education correlationρ = α1 ∗ (σparents/σchildren) (2.19)
where σparents and σchildren are the standard deviation of parental and children’s
education, respectively. The correlation coefficient is “standardised” by the ratio
of the standard deviations for the two generations and can be used to measure the
intergenerational educational persistence in a society. Although ρ and α1 do not
establish the causality, they quantify the persistence of educational inequality from
one generation to the next. In terms of educational mobility across generations, the
lower value of ρ and α1 is associated with greater mobility.
20
Checchi et al. (2013) argue that a change in ρ captures not only a change in
the parent–child education correlation, but also a chance in other events in the ed-
ucation system, such as the expansion of compulsory primary education or higher
education expansion. To disentangle the effects of these events from the educational
correlation between parents and children, they propose decomposing ρ into three
components: changes in the dispersion of the educational attainment of parents and
children around the respective means, changes in children’s educational attainment
conditional on the educational attainment of the parents, and changes in the uncon-
ditional distribution of parental educational attainment. They argue that changes
in children’s schooling conditional on parent’s education is the most relevant for
policy. In this thesis, several specifications have been used to identify the expansion
effects on intergenerational educational mobility.
2.4 Returns to Educational Attainment
Following a standard Mincer (1974) analysis, it can be assumed that the natural
logarithm of individual earnings is a function of schooling years and other explana-
tory variables. The Mincer function is used as a common method to measure the
return to education as follows:
LnYi = β0 + β1Si + β2Xi + ui (2.20)
where LnYi is the natural logarithm of annual earnings, Si is school years com-
pleted, Xi is a vector of other explanatory variables, ui is a disturbance terms. The
parameter β1 measures the percentage change in wage for each additional year of
schooling. It is expected that workers with a higher education level will earn higher
wages.
Some papers used the modified Mincer equation to analyse the returns to edu-
cation. Wage rates can be affected by other variables, such as gender, experience,
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and region. Li (2003) has changed the standard function to:
LnYi = β0 + β1Si + β2Ei + β3E
2
i + β4Gender + β5region+ ui (2.21)
For returns to education, several studies show that there are positive returns to
education in the labour markets. Although estimates for the return to education in
developed countries have been carried out since the seminal work of Mincer (1974),
it is only recently that economists have begun to estimate it in developing countries.
Several papers found rather low returns from urban China in the 1980s and 1990s,
with a year of schooling increasing earnings by just 2% to 4% (Byron and Manaloto,
1990). However, several economists believe that as the urban economy was still
under a planned regime during that period, the return to education should increase
after the transition. Using the urban household survey conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics from 1988 to 2001, there was a quick increase in return to
education, from only 4% in 1988 to more than 10% in 2001 (Zhang et al., 2005). In
terms of calculation methods, the Mincer equation has been widely used to calculate
additional schooling contributing to the increase of earnings (Yang, 2005). Some
other studies used the dummy variables to analyse in regression.
Endogeneity is a potential problem in the estimation because some unobservable
factors about ability bias, such as the capability and diligence, family background,
might affect the logarithm of earnings as well as the years of schooling. To overcome
the problems, some papers use the instrumental variable (IV). To be appropriate, the
instrumental variable should be correlated with the years of schooling, but should
not affect earnings except through the effect of years of schooling.
The first stage estimates years of schooling as follows:
Si = α0 + α1IV + α2Xi + vi (2.22)
From the last section, it is clear that family background is a main factor to
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determine children’s education. The link for educational inequality and returns to
education followed Blanden et al. (2007)’s framework:
ychildi = γ0 + γ1y
parents
i + vi (2.23)
Intergenerational mobility is measured by regressing log sons’ income on log
parental income in their childhood. Then separated γ1 into two stages. The two
equations can be shown as
edchildi = η0 + η1y
parents
i + vi (2.24)
ychildi = pi0 + pi1ed
child
i + vi (2.25)
The first equation concentrates on a regression of education attainment on par-
ents’ background, while the second equation measures the return to education. From
this, intergeneration mobility can be estimated.
These equations can be used to address the following questions: who attends
higher education institutions and does attendance depend on family background?
Is the return to education increasing? These questions have attracted economists’
attention, for the reason that family backgrounds play an important role in children’s
education and levels of education are linked with greater earnings. Differing family
backgrounds can lead to an education inequality and in turn, education inequality
may bring about income inequality.
Despite the above review of the theoretical and empirical literature, very few
studies have examined the intergenerational persistence and returns to education in
connection with higher educational expansion. Education is a mechanism by which
children from richer families can obtain better education and consequently higher
earnings. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 follow the above theoretical methodologies to
estimate children’s education outcomes and the labour market. Chapter 4 estimates
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the distributed consequences of the education expansion and the impact of diverse
family backgrounds on college opportunities. The basic method in this chapter fol-
lows equation 2.24 to observe the changes of the intergenerational mobility between
family background and children’s education outcomes regarding higher education
expansion. The results indicate that the education of parents remains a strong de-
terminant of educational outcomes among children after education reform. Chapter
5 compares the returns to education under higher education expansion, and iden-
tifies the distribution of returns to education by exploring a natural experiment.
This chapter follows equation 2.25 to examine the relationship between children’s
schooling years and the labour market with respect to higher education policy. The
findings illustrate that the expansion has a negative effect on college graduates’
returns and labour market outcomes.
To conclude, this chapter includes a review of the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature from several aspects. Section 2.1 reviews the theories of the Becker-Tomes
quantity-quality models, focusing on how family size affects children’s outcomes
as adults. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature surrounding the association
between education and economic development. Education can be viewed as a sig-
nificant factor of economic development. Section 2.3 discusses intergenerational mo-
bility from income and educational perspectives. Finally, Chapter 2.4 reviews the
theory of returns to education which relate to higher education expansion reform.
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Chapter 3
The Trade-off between Child
Quantity and Quality: Evidence
from China’s One-child Policy
3.1 Introduction
The empirical effect of family size on child outcome is a question of longstand-
ing interest for economic scholars. A large amount of literature provides evidence
that family size has a negative effect on children’s achievement. The classic theory
of quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off states that an increase in the quantity of chil-
dren increases the marginal cost of investment in their quality (children outcomes)
(Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976). To test this the-
ory, numerous empirical studies have found a negative relationship between family
size and children’s schooling years in different countries and support for the Q-Q
trade-off (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Li et al., 2008;
Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). These studies suggest that parents who have fewer
children allocate more time and resources to each child assuming parents invest in
children equally and have constant family income.
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Other studies, however, imply that children’s outcomes are not significantly af-
fected by the number of children, and hence conclude that there is no evidence for
Q-Q trade-off. Black et al. (2004) argue that children with more siblings may be
better off as a large family provides more opportunities to learn and teach from each
other and more social interaction with other children. Angrist et al. (2010) conduct
a study based on Israeli data and did not observe any negative impact of having
more children. Zajonc and Markus (1982) show additional children also lower the
marginal cost of investment in the quality for all children as children in the same
family must share resources such as clothes and books. Qian (2006) indicates an
sibling raises the school enrolment of the first child by 8-17%. Consequently, recent
empirical research tends to have less conclusive findings.
The major difficulty in establishing the causal relationship of quantity on qual-
ity of children is that both are jointly determined by their parents. Thus, the
observed Q-Q trade-off may be spurious because of parental preferences and house-
hold characteristics. For example, since parents with the preference for high quality
of schooling choose to have fewer children and invest more in their children’s edu-
cation, the negative correlation between family size and schooling will be driven by
unobserved parental preferences rather than by family size. To address this prob-
lem, some studies have exploited the variation in the number of children caused
by exogenous factors, such as twins (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Black et al.,
2004), the sex composition of the first two children (Angrist et al., 2010; Conley
and Glauber, 2006), and multiple births of the second or third child (Angrist et al.,
2010). establishing the causal relationship of quantity on quality of children
Another challenge researchers face is that family financial background could limit
the effect on child quality in developed countries. Shea (2000) shows that family
income can not influence children’s human capital in the United States. Another
study by Black et al. (2004) concludes that there is no Q-Q trade-off in Norway due to
the comprehensive welfare system and free public education system. Consequently,
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even if a family with fewer children has more human capital investment in children,
they may not receive more years of schooling, especially in developed countries with
well-functioning public education. For the reason, research from developing countries
tends to support the Q-Q trade-off model. This chapter apples a Chinese dataset to
check the existence of the Q-Q trade-off. Additionally, the one-child policy provides
a unique natural experiment for examining the trade-off theory.
In developing countries, family investments still have a strong effect on children’s
human capital (Brown, 2006). Some countries have advocated policies to promote
small families aiming at improving capital accumulation and economic development.
From the government’s view, policy-makers desire to slow down population growth
and increase human capital investment. China, as the world’s most populous coun-
try, implemented a family planning policy to limit family size and curb population
growth. The initial purposes of the family planning policies related not only to
family size limitation, but also to improve children welfare. If the Q-Q hypothesis
is correct, the policy has a potentially positive effect on increasing child quality (Li
et al., 2008). Understanding the trade-off between child quantity and quality is cru-
cial for evaluating the effectiveness of former policies and for constructing effective
future policies.
The one-child policy in China was enforced in 1979 in order to curb the country’s
explosive population growth and increase child welfare (Banister, 1991). Under the
policy, which only applied to Han Chinese, each couple was permitted to have only
one child. Families of some ethnic minorities could be eligible to have another child.
Second births were forbidden except under extenuating circumstances. Parents with
unsanctioned births were forced to pay a penalty for an additional child and might
also face other punishments. In contrast, families who complied with the one-child
policy can obtain extra food rations, free health care and cash subsidies (Short and
Fengying, 1998). Consequently, this policy had caused a sharp decline in fertility
and created a large number of one-child households in China (see Figure 3.2 and
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Figure 3.3 in the appendix). Li, Zhang and Yi (2005) point out that the one-child
policy has a large effect on fertility. The average effect on the post-policy cohorts
on the probability of having a second child is as large as -11 percentage points.
However, after four years of strict control, in 1984, local governments introduced a
more relaxed policy to allow for a second child for rural citizens if the first child is
a girl (Short and Fengying, 1998). The purpose of the relaxation was to increase
the demand for workforce and to improve the female survival ratio in cases where
the parents prefer to keep boys if they are only permitted to have one child in
a rural location due to the preference for a male child. Relaxation is used as an
instrumental variable for the family size in this paper. Qian (2006) is one of the first
to use the relaxation as an instrument for fertility. She uses exogenous variation in
number of children caused by the relaxation to examine the causal effect of family
size on school enrolment and finds another sibling increases schooling enrolment of
the first child by 8-17%. Her sample is restricted to the first child in individuals
born during 1972-1981. Liu (2014) use the eligibility for having two children and
fines for unsanctioned births as instruments for fertility from survey 1993.
Consequently, this study investigates the causal effects between family size and
outcomes of children where family size varies due to the one-child policy. The goal
is to examine whether more children in a family have a negative impact on children
quality, and if higher education of parents and more household income have a positive
influence on children quantity. This study makes several contributions to the existing
literature. First, the main contribution is to establish the causal effect of family size
on the quality of children. Second, we use the panel data to analyse a longer time
period from 1989 to 2011. The third is the use of a new instrumental variable (IV)
for fertility—local policy relaxation under Chinese birth control. Moreover we add
health as an additional outcome dimension in addition to child school enrolment
and education level. The findings indicate that the family size has a strong effect on
improving children’s completed years of schooling. This results clearly support the
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prediction by Becker and Lewis (1973) of the Q-Q trade-off of children; however,
there is no evidence for the Q-Q trade-off when using health as the measure of child
quality. One of the reasons is that, in china, the lack of nutrition is not a significant
concern for child development.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2, the literature
review, includes the Q-Q trade-off model in developed and developing countries
and the one-child policy in rural China. Section 3.3 presents data and descriptive
statistics. Section 3.4 follows with the empirical method used. Section 3.5 presents
the estimates of the effect of family size on child outcome and robustness checks.
Finally, Section 3.6 draws conclusions for this chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 The Quantity and Quality Trade-off
The initial focus of early literature on the theory of a Q-Q trade-off for children
was on the function of family size on child’s schooling. Becker and his colleagues’
classic Q-Q models (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976)
suggest that the policy promoting smaller families is likely to be effective for child
achievement since as the child quantity increases, the total cost or shadow price
of quality (investment in children) also increases, thus decreasing the demand for
quality, and vice versa. Some empirical studies have tried to examine the Q-Q
trade-off and have either proved the prediction by observing a negative relationship
between family size and child outcome or found no such relationship (Blake, 1989;
Knodel et al., 1990; Knodel and Wongsith, 1991) because some studies treat family
size as exogenous variables, and cannot establish causality. However, it is important
to ensure that any observed relationship between number of children and outcomes
is causal. A number of approaches have been taken to ensure it. The previous
methodologies which have already established causality are as follows.
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Several methodologies have been used to test the Q-Q trade-off model using
instrumental variables in both developed and developing countries. A pioneering
study using twins as an instrument variable is that of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980),
who observe that family size (as induced by the birth of twins) has a negative effect
on children’s achievement in a small sample which includes 25 twins in about 1,600
children of India. However, more recent studies by Black et al. (2004) and Angrist
et al. (2005), which also use twins as the exogenous variation, find no evidence for
a Q-Q trade-off of children. Specifically, Black et al. (2004) analyses the trade-off
based on a larger sample of the entire population of Norway during the period 1986
to 2000. After a series of estimations, they point out no evidence of a negative
correlation between family size and children’s education. Another research work by
Angrist et al. (2005), who uses both twins and gender composition as the instrument
variables (IV), also finds no proof for the theory. Moreover, another influential study
by Li et al. (2008) estimates the topic based on a large number of the population
census of China in 1990. They used the instrument of family size with twin births
to investigate the causal relationship between family size and child education, and
found empirical support for the adverse effect of fertility on children’s educational
attainment. The use of twins is an appropriate IV because twins are one way of
getting two children in a restrictive environment. They also report the trade-off
relationship is more obvious in rural China than urban areas.
Li et al. (2008) explain the reasons for the contrast between their results and
those of Black et al. (2004) and Angrist et al. (2005) as possibly being due to the
development level of the education in these countries. The developed countries such
as Norway, have a good public education system (even university education is free)
and also government invest for children’s education; parents are not under pressure
to pay the tuition fee and educational expenditure. Thus, the Q-Q trade-off is not
obvious in these developed countries. On the contrary, the less-developed countries,
such as India and China, do not have excellent public education systems, educational
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facilities, or generous support from the government. Their educational expenditure
accounts for a large proportion of the family budget, especially for rural residents.
They find that Q-Q trade-off is more likely to happen in these developing countries.
Another instrumental variable for family size used by some economists is the
gender of the first child. According to Lee (2008), a new instrumental variable,
which is the first child’s gender, has been used for fertility in South Korea, since in
several Asian countries, parents would rather have sons to daughters. Male child
preferences cause some specific patterns in fertility. For example, if the parents want
to have at least one son in the family and the first child is not a boy, they are more
likely to have another child. Hence, the first child’s sex becomes a perfect predictor
for the probability of having another child and family size. Conley and Glauber
(2006) and Angrist et al. (2005) use the first two children’s gender composition
as an instrument for the family size as parents prefer to have a mixed gender in
their family. Therefore, the family with same-gender children is more likely to have
another child.
However, in developing countries, some studies still treat family size as an ex-
ogenous variable and also cannot establish causality. The child quantity and quality
are endogenous variables. The reason is that childbearing and child quality are
jointly determined by their parents (Browning, 1992; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995),
which implies that they are both affected by unobservable household characteristics
or parental preferences. Li et al. (2008) use datasets from the Chinese population
census to examine the effect of family size on child educational outcome in China.
This study takes into account the endogeneity of family size. This is one of the first
to use twins data from developing countries to measure the impact of family size on
child outcomes.
Another study by Qian (2006) applies the triple interaction of the birth cohort
of the children, the gender of the first child, and local policy relaxation as an IV. It
exploits exogenous changes in family size caused by the relaxation of the one-child
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policy to examine the effect of family size on first child’s school enrolment. An extra
child increases educational years of first-born children and increases the marginal
cost of quality for all children. Qian’s paper examines the effect of increasing house-
hold size from one to two on school enrolment in rural area of China. It has shown
clearly that the older children benefit more from having a younger sibling. It also
suggests that the effect of family size may be non-monotonic across family size.
There is no Q-Q trade-off in Qian’s study, because she just focuses exclusively on
the benefits of the eldest child.
In the study of the potential causal effect of family size on girls’ educational
outcomes in Mexico, Fitzsimons and Malde (2014) find no evidence of such an effect.
The source of exogenous variation in family size explored is parental preferences for
having at least one male child. It accounts for the endogeneity of family size using
a succession of female-only births as a source of exogenous variation in family size.
Fitzsimons and Malder’s paper exploits large samples and high fertility rates to
consider the effects of family size on a range of different education outcomes.
There are several studies that have examined the trade-off in the recent Chinese
context. Numerous previous studies have explored the determinants of Chinese chil-
dren’s educational attainment and emphasised the rural-urban gap (Connelly and
Zheng, 2003; Knight and Shi, 1993), gender inequality (Hannum, 2002; Tsui and
Rich, 2002), or poverty and credit constraints (Brown, 2006). However, these stud-
ies either ignore the effect of family size or merely treat it as an exogenous control
variable. In contrast, some other aspects of household behaviour have been consid-
ered in association with family size. Wu and Li (2012) examine the impact of family
size on maternal health outcomes under the Chinese one-child policy. The intergen-
eration quantity-quality trade-off implies that having more children decreases the
resource allocated to mothers and affects their health outcomes. Consequently, it
is necessary to test the child quantity-quality trade-off in a way which accounts for
endogenous fertility.
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3.2.2 One-child Policy
In the early 1970s, after two decades of rapid population growth in China, policy
makers formulated a series of policies to control population increases. In order to
slow down fast population growth, the Chinese central government enacted its birth
planning campaign in 1971, with the slogan “Later (later marriage), Longer (longer
intervals between two children), and Fewer (fewer children)” (McElroy and Yang,
2000). The main objective was to encourage couples to get married late, to expand
birth intervals, and to have fewer children. At the first step of the birth planning
campaign, the policy was mostly carried out through persuasion. Later, it was
substituted by straightly controlling the number of children per family. The one-
child policy, which was much stricter, was formally announced and enforced across
the country in 1979. Each family was permitted to only have one child, another
child was allowed only under exceptional circumstances–for example, with ethnic
minorities.
Therefore, after the announcement of the one-child policy, households were given
“birth quotas”, and they were penalised when they had “above-quota births”. The
punishment for violators of the family planning policy was mainly in the form of
monetary penalties. Nevertheless, “above-quota births” were still inevitable, espe-
cially for rural residents. This is because farmers, normally without government
pensions and with few savings, still needed their children to support them when
they were at old age. Generally, urban families were easier to persuade and control
since most people in the cities worked in the government or state owned enterprises
where the administrative forces and political control were strong. For instance, peo-
ple may even lose their jobs or lose the opportunity to get promoted. In contrast,
rural families were more difficult to convince and control with regard births. More-
over, the penalties for unsanctioned children were more serious in urban areas than
rural areas. The urban residents had to pay fines which were as high as three to six
times the annual salary. In contrast, the punishment for rural people was a one-shot
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payment for the unsanctioned birth. However, even that type of fine could not be
paid due to the poverty of families. At the same time, reward can be provided to
the individuals who complied with the policy, such as better housing, child health
subsidies, extra food or cash subsidies.
Due to the difficulties in enforcing the one-child policy, particularly in rural areas,
the policy was relaxed as early as 1984. The main relaxation was named the “1-son-
2-child” rule. It states that rural couples were allowed to have a second birth if the
first child was a girl. The permission for a second child were not made widespread
until “Document 7” was issued by the central committee. The document permitted
that the central government devolved responsibility to the local and provincial gov-
ernment so that local conditions could be better addressed (Qian, 2006). The reason
of relaxation was to consider the difficulties in enforcing the one-child policy and
the high labour demand in rural areas. According to this policy, the government’s
goal was to maintain low fertility rates and decrease infanticide. If the couples could
only have one child, parents probably just preferred to keep boys than girls. The
relaxation of a one-child policy increased female survival by almost ten percent, and
at the same time it also reduced sex selection to pre-one-child policy levels (Li, Yao,
Zhang and Zhou, 2005).
In this chapter, we concentrate on the Q-Q trade-off in rural China. There are
several reasons for this. In urban areas, it is still difficult to have an additional child;
people in these areas normally prefer to have just one child and to invest more money
on their child’s education. In contrast, the most common relaxation is to permit
rural families to have a second child if the first birth is a girl. Moreover, children’s
educational expenditure still accounts for a large rate of the family budget. Indeed,
poverty is the principal reason that children drop out of school. Many rural schools
were shut down and school enrolment rates dropped dramatically. Consequently, the
enrolment rate of children in rural areas is much lower than those in urban areas,
and the decision as to whether children can go to school is still dependent on family
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investment and size. Therefore, it is important to analyse whether the trade-off
in rural areas still exists. Relaxation of the one child policy is a valid instrument
to examine the causal impacts of family size on child quality. Consequently, it
provides a special opportunity for us to examine the Q-Q trade-off issue in developing
countries.
There are several other studies focused on sex ratio under the one-child policy.
Bulte et al. (2011) suggest that there are as many as 40 million “missing” women
in China. The outcomes indicate that the preference for boys is the major driver
of the gender gap, and the one-child policy will be responsible for about half of the
gap. Unsurprisingly, the interaction between the one-child policy and sex selection
technologies have contributed to the gender gap between males and females as sex-
selective abortions are common in rural areas. According to Li et al. (2008), the one-
child policy leads to about 7.0 extra boys per 100 girls for 1991-2004 birth cohorts.
The effect of the one-child policy accounts for about 57% and 54% of the total
increases in sex ratios for the 1991-2000 and 2001-2005 birth cohorts, respectively.
However, the one-child policy has a number of benefits for children. Lee (2012)
shows that children in one-child households enjoyed important and improved educa-
tional opportunities compared to children who are from multiple-child households;
the benefits for girls was much larger than that of boys. Additionally, it has shown
there is no big difference in schooling years between one-child girls and one-child
boys, whereas the gap between males and females in multiple-child households re-
mains considerable. Schooling years for girls who have male siblings were less than
that of girls with female siblings. This paper concludes that the one-child policy
contributed to greater educational gender equality in China. In this chapter, we will
present new evidence on the child Q-Q trade-off and check the effectiveness of the
one-child policy.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This chapter mainly uses the data from the rural sample of the China Health and
Nutrition Survey (CHNS). It is an ongoing international joint project conducted by
the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina and the Chinese
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. The CHNS is a panel of households in
nine waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011) (see Table 3.15
in the appendix). In each survey, it uses a multistage random cluster process to draw
a sample of approximately 4,400 households with a total of 16,000 to 19,000 individ-
uals in nine provinces stretching from northeast to southwest (Guangxi, Guizhou,
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong plus Beijing,
Shanghai, and Chongqing added in 2011)(see Figure 3.1 in the appendix). After
randomly selecting four counties and two cities in each province, the CHNS team
identified urban and suburban regions in each city, and villages and towns in each
county (Popkin et al., 2009).
The regions vary substantially, geographically, and economically and in terms
of public resources and health circumstances. The dataset contains a record of
individuals including age, gender, birth years, education, and occupation, household
details including family annual income, household size, and community including
relaxation for the one-child policy. As the data can be used to link children to parents
at the household level, family size and birth order can be calculated. In detail, the
“relationship to head of household” file can be used to match children to the parents
in the same household. In detail, the person who is labelled “son/daughter” of the
head of the household are considered as the primary observation while those labelled
“head of household” or “spouse” are treated as “parents” to all the children in the
household. Family size and birth order can be obtained by counting the quantity
of children and calculating the birth date sequence. In addition to dropping the
families with no children, this study used only the children of the household head,
as these children alone can be matched with their parental information.
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3.3.1 Dependent Variables
The CHNS, as panel data, enabled households to be interviewed in nine waves
between 1989 and 2011. For each wave, we identified school-aged children, namely
at least 6 year olds. Age 6 is the minimum number of school enrolment and no
educational information is recorded for children younger than 6 years old1. Presented
in Table 3.1 below are the age ranges for the schooling level in the Chinese education
system. The children aged 15 may have already completed the compulsory school
(primary and junior middle school).
The observations exclude households whose oldest child was born before 1976,
4 years prior to the implementation of the one-child policy. The 4-year interval is
considered as it was the recommended birth interval before the adoption of the one-
child policy. For parents whose first child was born before 1976, their decision of
having a second child was not affected by the one-child policy. For the parents whose
first child was born in 1977 and later, the eligibility for having another child would
reply on the new regulation if they followed the birth interval.
Table 3.1: Education Level in China
Level Grades Age
Primary Grades 1-6 6-12
Junior Middle School Grade 7-9 13-15
Senior Middle School Grade 10-12 16-18
(or Vocational School)
College or University Varies 19-22
In this chapter, there are four dependent variables to measure children’s quality:
school enrolment, completed years of schooling and health outcomes, which are
height and BMI (Body Mass Index). Education is the most common outcome to
1According to the Chinese Compulsory Education Law, the official school entry age for children
is 6, but in some rural areas where the school system cannot cope with the demand, the school
entry age can be set at 7 or 8 by the local government. Using the CHNS data, we checked the
school enrolment rate and found no big difference. So 6 is the school entry year in our sample
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measure child quality. Two education variables are reported: school enrolment and
completed years of schooling. The indicators can be created from the following
three questions in the sample of CHNS: (1) How many years of schooling have you
completed in regular school? (2) What is the highest level of education attained?
(3) Are you currently at school? The school enrolment variable is obtained from
question (3). It is defined as a binary variable that is equal to 1 if individuals are
still at school at the time of survey, and 0 if the respondents had dropped out of
school or never entered. Some studies (Glewwe et al., 2001; Li, Yao, Zhang and
Zhou, 2005) have shown that school enrolment is a good indicator of educational
attainment in developing countries. The observations of this sample are the children
who were between 6 and 15 years old as children should be at school at this age.
Moreover, the completed years of schooling are derived from questions (1) and (2).
This dependent variable focuses on the sample of children who were 16 years old or
older. Students should have completed their compulsory education at age 16.
In addition to education, two health outcomes are used as quality measures:
height and BMI. As discussed by Thomas (1994), height reflects children’s long-
run nutritional status and is also related to their mental development, education
level and wages in adulthood. For instance, Zhao and Glewwe (2010) conclude that
there has a significant positive effect between children’s height and schooling. The
CHNS contains information of physical examination, from which we can get details
on children’s height and weight. After controlling for age, height can be considered
as a health indicator of children’s quality (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). BMI2 can
be used to another indicator to measure the nutrition status of children.
3.3.2 Control Variables
Furthermore, a vector of other individual, household, and community characteristics
are included as control variables. These variables contain child age, parents’ ages,
2BMI = weight(kg)/height(m)2. More details in the appendix.
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gender, household income, father’s schooling years and occupation, and mother’s
education and work status that might confound the policy effect on the children’s
outcomes. To control for the impact of genetic endowment on child height, we add
parents’ heights in the regression of health. A detailed definition of variables and
descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
School enrolmenta Dummy variable: 1 for enrolled; 0 otherwise 0.91 0.28 0 1
Schooling yearsb Completed years of Schooling 9.45 2.40 0 18
Heightac Cumulative height 136 15 97 181
BMIa Cumulative BMI 16.64 2.58 10.79 32.79
Gender Dummy variable: 1 for males, 0 otherwise 0.56 0.49 0 1
Father age Father’s cumulative age 42.63 7.67 24.96 70.71
Father schooling Father’s cumulative years of schoolings 7.48 3.16 0 18
Father farm work Dummy variable: 1 for farming working, 0 other 0.93 0.24 0 1
Mother age Mother’s cumulative age 40.99 7.32 19.85 70.37
Mother schooling Mother’s cumulative years of schoolings 5.39 3.90 0 17
Mother work status Dummy variable: 1 for working, 0 otherwise 0.84 0.36 0 1
a School enrolment rate and health are calculated using the sample of children who were between 6 to
15.
b Completed schooling years are calculated using the sample of children who were at least 16 years old.
c Height is measured by cm.
Most importantly, the survey provides detailed information about family plan-
ning policy at village and township level in the community survey. To examine the
effect of the one-child policy on children outcomes, it is important to develop an
appropriate measures of the policy. Short et al. (2001) indicates that variations
of the relaxation are likely to be a reasonable indicator of local policy. While the
eligibility criteria for having another child are set by provincial government, the
regulations are mostly implemented by the local county or township governments.
The community survey of the CHNS asked local officers whether the families in their
towns or villages are allowed to have a second child if the first birth is a girl. If it is
allowed, we treat it as relaxation (1), if it is not allowed, it means the area is strictly
no relaxation (0).
The relaxation is used as instrument variable in the methodology of 2SLS. The
relaxation changes between the waves of the survey at county level. Based on local
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economic development and population size, local government can formulate basic
different regulations. Between 1979 and 1984, the one-child policy was very strict.
After that time, it allowed for regional variation for girl-exception at county level
under family planning policy. Most of the counties are continually relaxed or con-
tinually non-relaxed under girl-exception policy. In 1984, permissions for another
child become common until “Document 7” was issued by the central government.
There are two main purposes of implementing this policy. First, it was to curb fe-
male infanticide and forced abortion. Second, the central government devolved the
responsibility onto the local and provincial government. The county or township
government needed to implement the policy according to local conditions. There-
fore, some villages have changed to relaxed areas from non-relaxation because of the
stronger boy-biased sex selection and forced abortion than average, while other vil-
lages have become non-relaxed from relaxed due to urbanisation. For the abnormal
data, if there is just one different data to others, we changed it to all relaxed or all
not relaxed. Also we dropped the small amount of the data (5%) which indicated
that the policy varied more than expected, alternating between relaxed and not
relaxed several times. The changes for the relaxation are in Table 3.3 as follows.
Table 3.3: Relaxation
Freq Percent
All Relaxed 69 45.39
All Not Relaxed 54 35.52
Become Relaxed 18 11.85
Become Not Relaxed 11 7.23
Total 152 100.00
The observations include families whose oldest child was born after 1976. We
also focused on children at least age 6. The birth years of children have been merged
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with the relaxation status in their counties. In the latest survey of CHNS in 2011,
the youngest child was born in 2004. So for the trend of relaxation, we concentrated
on the relaxation in the survey year between 1989 and 2004. If the areas are relaxed
or non-relaxed, we merged all the targeted children to the relaxation status. There
is a small number (18%) of counties which had changed the relaxation status. If
they were different during the two surveys, we assumed the differences occurred in
the middle time period. For example, one village was relaxed in 1997 and changed
to non-relaxed from 2000. We merged the children who were born before 1999 in
relaxed areas. However, those who were born from 1999 were in non-relaxed places.
We merged all the children with the relaxation status who were born between 1976
to 2004. The descriptive statistics of outcomes in relaxed and non-relaxed areas are
in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Outcomes in Relaxed and Non-relaxed Areas
Relaxed areas Non-relaxed areas
Number of children 2.38 1.93
%families have only child 13.26% 36.77%
Gender Ratio 0.55 0.56
Father age 42.19 43.57
Father schooling years 7.32 7.83
Father farm work 0.71 0.48
Mother age 41.60 41.69
Mother schooling years 5.33 5.42
Mother work or not 0.82 0.85
These figures show, as we expect, that the families in relaxed areas have more
children and more girls. In relaxed areas, the average number of children in a
family is 2.38, while there are 1.93 children on average in non-relaxed areas. Table
3.5 reports the frequency distribution of the number of children in relaxed and non-
relaxed areas. At the same time, children in relaxed areas have younger parents with
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lower education. More fathers have jobs related to farming in relaxed places. It is
more likely that relaxed areas tend to be more rural and we take account of these
fixed differences by exploiting the panel data collection approach. The following
sections explain the empirical method used in more details.
Table 3.5: The Association between Relaxation and the Number of Children
No. of Children
Relaxed areas Non-relaxed areas
Frequency Percentages Frequency Percentages
1 961 13.26 1280 36.77
2 3539 48.43 1400 40.22
3 1998 27.57 570 16.37
4 558 7.70 196 5.63
5 171 2.36 196 5.63
6 21 0.29 35 1.01
Total 7248 100.00 3481 100.00
3.4 Empirical Methods
3.4.1 Identification
This chapter uses 2SLS to establish the causal effect of child quantity on child edu-
cational attainments and health outcomes. The relaxation of the one-child policy is
used as an instrumental variable for the family size. Qian (2006) uses county level
data on family planning policy and finds that the probability to receive the 1-son-
two-child relaxation for a local county is positively correlated with the proportion
of sex-selection before the relaxation policy and both are positively related with
distance from the provincial capital. The aim of the relaxation is to maintain low
population growth and decrease female infanticide. Simultaneously, provincial gov-
ernments granted the relaxation policy to counties which had longer distance to the
administrative capital where the female infanticide was more prevalent. The higher
prevalence of sex selection in rural areas can be due to both more boy-preference
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in distant rural areas and the fact that geographic distance increases the provincial
government’s difficulty of preventing infanticide. These facts increase the probabil-
ity to obtain the relaxation policy at county level. To be a valid instrument, the
relaxation should not be affected by strong parental preference for children’s out-
comes. Also, the probability of becoming relaxation is not directly related to the
dependent variables which are child outcomes.
The common eligibility for having two children is that the first child is a girl.
However, in some areas, families are allowed to have two children. A fine, determined
at the county level, is imposed on having unsanctioned births. Liu (2014) mentions,
in relaxed areas, couples face less heavy fines for ineligible couples. Therefore, the
relaxation, which allows two children in a family, is used as an instrument variable
to examine family size on educational and health outcomes. One concern for the
one-child policy as an instrument is the use of sex-selective abortion. Liu (2014)
argues that this is unlikely to be a problem. In relaxed areas, parents have little
incentive to use sex-selective abortion to control the gender of their first child. If
the first child is a girl, parents are still eligible to have another one. In non-relaxed
areas, couples might want to use sex-selective abortion if the first child is going to
be a girl. However, if no one is permitted to have two children in their counties, the
use of sex-selective abortion does not affect their eligibility status either. Liu (2014)
uses the Chinese population census to calculate the sex ratio and finds sex-selective
abortion does not have a significant effect on the gender of first children.
3.4.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation
In subsection 3.4.1, the validity of instrument has been discussed. After the recent
empirical literature, this study proposes the following causal model. First, the OLS
general estimation is specified as follows:
Yitc = β0 + β1SIZEitc + β2Xitc + β3Zitc + γt + ηc + ξitc (3.1)
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where Yitc is a matrix of child outcome measures which includes education and health
outcomes 3, the dependent variable is for the individual i born in county level c, birth
year t. The main independent variable SIZEitc is the number of children in the
family and the coefficient β1 is the causal effect of interest. The regression includes a
set of control variables; Xitc is the vector of child characteristics including children’s
age, gender, birth year, and place of residence. Zitc is a set of parental circumstances
that affect the outcome, including age, years of schooling, and employment status
which is a dummy equal to 1 if the parents are working in farming, 0 otherwise.
The regression also includes a survey year fixed effect, while γt is a birth fixed effect
and ηc is the county fixed effect. ξitc is an error term that might be correlated with
SIZEitc. In the OLS estimate, we treat SIZEitc as exogenous. However, family
size is likely to be endogenous. In order to control for the potential endogeneity
of SIZEitc, we instrument it with the relaxation policy which is the eligibility for
having two children.
For all the estimates, we controlled the full set of children and parents’ circum-
stances which were comprised of: the child’s age, gender, parent’s age, education
level, and employment status. Parent’s education level can be regarded as completed
years of formal education. The data has information on parents’ monthly income
and their annual bonus. However, there is a great deal of missing data about in-
come. If we use income as a variable it may cause bias and decrease the sample
number. Farming is another indicator for family wealth; farming work indicates less
household income. If a father works just in farming, we treat the variable as 1. If
a father works in a company or in other skilled work, we put the variable as 0. We
also treat the mother’s employment status as 1 for working, and 0 for not working.
In the regression for a health outcome, we added the information about the parents’
heights to control for genetic endowment on child height.
3Angrist and Pischke (2008) discussed a nonlinear model may fit the CEF for LDVs more closely
than a linear model; however, when it comes to marginal effects, this probably matters little. This
optimistic conclusion is not a theorem, but, as in the empirical example, it seems to be fairly
robustly true. In practice, we used a probit/logit model to replace; however, there is no difference.
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3.4.3 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation
To reveal the OLS evidence for the Q-Q trade-off, we regress a dependent variable
for education and health outcomes on the variable for the number of children in a
household. The coefficient β1, as estimated by OLS, may merely suggest a corre-
lation, because family size is likely to be endogenous. To control for the potential
endogeneity of family size, we instrument it with the relaxation for having two chil-
dren. Following the 2SLS equations from Qian (2006); Liu (2014); Li et al. (2008),
relaxation can be used as an identifying instrument of family size. We run the
first-stage regression.
SIZEitc = α0 + α1RELAXtc + α2Xitc + α3Zitc + λt + τc + νitc (3.2)
where SIZEitc is the number of children in the family, RELAXtc is equal to 1 if
the areas c are relaxed in year t which have the relaxation policy. It is equal to 0 if
the counties have a strict one-child policy. As discussed in section 3.3.2, counties can
be identified as relaxed or non-relaxed areas. Xitc and Zitc are the same control
variables with Equation 3.1. A valid instrument should be correlated with the
number of children in a family, but it should not affect the child outcome except
through family size. The eligibility for having two children is only correlated with the
family size. Therefore, the relaxation is an important source of exogenous variation
in fertility under the one-child policy that has been used in previous research.
And the second stage of 2SLS is the same with Equation 3.1. The SIZEitc is
the predicted level from the first stage regression.
Yitc = β0 + β1SIZEitc + β2Xitc + β3Zitc + κt + ωc + φitc (3.3)
The 2SLS estimation established a causal relationship of family size on educa-
tional and health outcomes. In the next section, results are reported from several
aspects: school enrolment, completed years of schooling, height and BMI.
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3.5 Empirical Results
OLS and 2SLS regressions have been run to test whether family size has a negative
effect on children’s educational attainment and health outcomes in China. First,
we report the OLS regression results in section 3.5.1. The dependent variables are
education attainments and health outcomes to measure child quality. The results
are reported separately for boys and girls. Second, to illustrate the identification
strategy, we use relaxation to establish the causal effect of family size on child quality
in section 3.5.2.
3.5.1 OLS Estimation
3.5.1.1 Family Size on Children’s Education Attainments
Results in Table 3.6 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of family size on chil-
dren’s education attainments. There are two dependent variables: school enrolment
and completed years of schooling. For the sample of school enrolment, the chil-
dren aged 6 to 15 years old are the target sample. Age 6 is the minimum age of
school enrolment and age 15 is the age to complete compulsory schooling. For the
sample of completed years of schooling, we focused on the individuals who were
16 years of age or older. These individuals belonged to the generation influenced
by the one-child policy and relaxation policy. The observations exclude households
whose oldest child was born before 1976, 4 years prior to the implementation of the
one-child policy. The 4-year interval is considered as it was the recommended birth
interval before the adoption of the one- child policy.
The results with educational enrolment as the dependent variable are reported
in the first three columns, and the results with completed schooling years as the
dependent variable are reported in the last three columns. These results indicate
that there is a statistically significant and negative correlation between family size
and child education. The findings imply that if the family have one more child,
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the probability of school enrolment of children decreases by 1.41 percentage points.
There are no significant differences between boys and girls. When the family has
another sibling, the probability of entering school for boys falls by 1.53 percent, while
the probability for girls declines by 1.23 percent. The estimation from completed
years of schooling suggests that having an additional sibling reduces 0.38 years of
schooling. The control variables are also interesting for us, as most of the parents’
education attainments have a positive effect on children’s schooling years. These
findings imply that the quality of children is dependent on the educational level of
their parents. It means well-educated parents invest more in education for their
children. Also, the family which relies more on farming has a negative effect on
children’s school attainments.
3.5.1.2 Family Size on Children’s Health Outcomes
Table 3.7 reports the OLS estimates of the effect of family size on children’s health
outcomes. The results with height as the dependent variable are reported in columns
1-3, and the results with BMI as the dependent variable are reported in columns
4-6. All the observations are of the children who were aged 6 to 15. After controlling
for child age, height can be considered as a health indicator of children’s quality.
BMI can be another indicator to measure the nutrition status of children. The
results suggest that having an additional child in a family reduces a child’s height
by 1.44cm. In addition, more siblings are also related to lower value of BMI. When
family has another child, the value of BMI decreases by 0.15 for boys and goes
down by 0.12 for girls. The gap of BMI between boys and girls is not significant.
However, the estimate is not statistically significant for BMI by gender. Therefore,
we conclude some reasons to explain. The observed Q-Q trade-off may be spurious
due to unobserved parental and household characteristics, and therefore cannot have
a causal interpretation. To increase the precision, in the next section, 2SLS is used
to establish a causal relationship to test Q-Q trade-off.
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3.5.2 2SLS Estimates
3.5.2.1 First-stage Estimation
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 report the first-stage regression results. The dependent
variable is number of children in the family, while the main independent variable
is relaxation of the one-child policy. All the regressions include county and birth
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county level. It is important to check
whether the policy was enforced correctly, by estimating the effect of the one-child
policy on family size for the gender of oldest siblings separately. The boys sample
and the girls sample are identified by the gender of the first child in a family. Table
3.8 contains the sample of school enrolment (6-15 years old) and years of schooling
(16 years of age or older) by the gender of oldest child. Table 3.9 includes the sample
of child health outcomes (6-15 years old). If the policy was enforced correctly, family
size should increase in relaxed areas, and first-born girls would have more siblings
than first-born boys due to the relaxation policy.
In Table 3.8 and Table 3.9, all the main estimates are statistically significant
at the 1% level and have a strong positive impact from the relaxation on family
size. The results reported in columns (2) and (5) show the impact of the relaxation
policy on fertility, if the first child is a boy. The results reported in columns (3)
and (6) show the impact of the relaxation on family size, if the first child is a girl.
It shows that the relaxation had greater effect on family size for the girls sample.
The families in relaxed areas have 0.42 more children on average than families in
non-relaxed areas in the 6-15 sample. If the oldest child in a family is a girl, there
are 0.52 more children on average in relaxed areas, which is much higher than the
boys sample (0.31). Additionally, the results reported in the sample of 16 years of
age or older in column 4-6 of Table 3.8 also show a significant positive correlation.
The figure shows, in relaxed areas, that there is a 0.45 greater family size than the
number in non-relaxed areas. In the sample of 16 years of age or older by gender,
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it shows that the relaxation policy has a strong and positive impact on family size,
particularly on families where girls are the oldest child. The coefficient for the girls
sample is 0.53, which is larger than the boys sample (0.34).
If the policy was enforced exactly, it should increase the number of siblings in
relaxed areas only for girls and have no effect on boys. However, as discussed in
the previous section, Liu (2014) mentions that, in relaxed areas couples face lighter
fines when having another child, if first child was a boy. Furthermore, relaxed
areas normally have a longer distance from the provincial capital. The geographic
distance increases the provincial government’s difficulty to implement the one-child
policy and the relaxation policy. Consequently, there still is an effect on family size
for first-born boys in relaxed areas. It might cause bias due to the above reasons.
However, this issue is not a big problem, as the coefficients for first-born girls are
significantly higher than those for first-born boys.
Therefore, the significant positive coefficients for first-born girls sample still in-
dicate the instrumental variable has considerable power to explain family size. The
relaxation of the one-child policy is highly correlated with the quantity of children
in a family. In relaxed areas, If the first child is a girl, the family has more opportu-
nity to have another child to increase the size of family. As discussed in subsection
3.4.1, the choice of relaxation also does not affect the child quality except through
family size. In the next subsection 3.5.2.2, we use the valid instrumental variable
for fertility to establish the causal effect of family size on child education and health
outcomes.
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3.5.2.2 Instrumental Variable
The second stage results of the estimation are reported in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11.
All the control variables used in the first stage regressions are included. In Table
3.10, the results with educational enrolment as the dependent variable are reported
in the first three columns, and the results with completed schooling years as the
dependent variable are reported in the last three columns. Table 3.11 shows the
results of health outcomes. The coefficients with height as the dependent variable
are reported in the first three columns, and the coefficients with the value of BMI
as the dependent variable are reported in the last three columns.
In Table 3.10, the results reported in columns (2) and (5) show the impact of
family size on children’s educational outcomes if the first child is a boy. The results
reported in columns (3) and (6) show the impact of quantity of children on child
quality if the first child is a girl. Although we observe the negative effects of family
size on school enrolment, the coefficients are statistically insignificant. While the
OLS estimate suggests that having a second child reduces the probability of school
enrolment of children by 1.41 percent (SE=0.006), the IV estimate indicates that
the impact could be 1.77 percent (SE=0.031). The insignificance is due to the larger
IV standard errors. For the dependent variable of completed years of schooling, the
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients suggest that,
on average, having an additional sibling is correlated with reducing schooling by 1.3
years. The differences between the OLS estimates and IV of completed schooling
years are large and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that OLS could be
biased downward by the potential correlation between SIZEitc and ξitc. We can
obtain the trade-off from the coefficient β1. Obviously, the effect for girls’ sample
(-1.87) is much stronger than the boys’ sample (-1.05). Therefore, the Q-Q trade-off
is stronger for the sample for the first child is a girl.
Table 3.11 shows the results of health outcomes, including height and BMI.
The coefficients are negative; however, they are not significant. While the OLS
54
estimate suggests that having an additional sibling reduces a child’s height by 1.44cm
(SE=0.181), the IV estimate indicates that the effect could be 1.29cm (SE=1.255).
Furthermore, while the OLS estimate indicates that having another child decreases
a child’s BMI value by 0.38 (SE=0.084), the IV estimate suggests that the effect
could be 0.39 (SE=0.451). The insignificance is also due to the larger IV standard
errors. From this evidence, the existence of Q-Q trade-off is sensitive to the measure
variable of quality.
From the above evidence, trade-off is much weaker if school enrolment is used
as the quality measure. We suggest that the free compulsory education and gov-
ernment intervention weaken the impact of parental investment on children’s school
enrolment. Figure 3.4 (see the appendix) shows the large percentage of primary
and junior secondary enrolment from 1990, in China. Most children are enrolled in
school for primary and junior secondary school. However, the education level is still
a type of private investment from their families. Therefore, the evidence supports
the Q-Q trade-off in the completed years of schooling.
Another contribution in this chapter is that we use health to measure child
quality, which has received little attention in China. There is no obvious evidence
to support the Q-Q trade-off, which is consistent with a recent empirical study using
the discontinuity design approach to test the trade-off (Zhong, 2014). The results
suggest that the lack of nutrition is not a significant concern for child development.
Therefore, the Q-Q trade-off is sensitive to the choice of quality measure.
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3.5.3 Robustness Checks
To check whether the results are sensitive to the relationship of family size on child
quality, we do a series of robustness checks.
3.5.3.1 Controlling for the Gender of First Child
The common requirement for having two children is that the first child was a girl.
The relaxation allowed parents to have a second child if the first birth was a girl.
Qian (2006) analyses family size on school enrolment for first born children in co-
horts born during 1972-1981. Girls are affected if the first child was born in a relaxed
location, and girls are more likely to have a sibling. Therefore, our sample is re-
stricted the whole analysis to the first born daughters to check the sensitivity. The
results report in Table 3.12 and suggest the Q-Q trade-off in years of schooling.
Table 3.12: Robustness Check after Controlling for the Gender of First Child
Chid Quality OLS IV
School enrolment -0.0175** -0.0385
(0.0075) (0.0373)
Years of Schooling -0.4513*** -1.2212***
(0.1309) (0.4679)
Height -1.4921*** -1.2129
(0.2646) (1.3292)
BMI -0.1282* -0.3267
(0.1270) (0.4228)
3.5.3.2 Controlling for the Birth Order Effect
Black et al. (2004) find that child quality is negatively correlated with birth order.
It is important to know whether the results are sensitive after controlling for the
birth order. Table 3.13 reports the estimation results using a sample which only
includes the first-born child. It shows that one more additional child decreases
years of schooling of the first born child by 1.8 years which is comparable to what
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have been reported in the main regressions.
Table 3.13: Robustness Check after Controlling for the Birth Order Effect
Chid Quality OLS IV
School enrolment -0.0201** -0.0262
(0.0090) (0.0358)
Years of Schooling -0.5147*** -1.8338***
(0.1153) (0.6607)
Height -2.182*** -2.613*
(0.3319) (1.509)
BMI -0.4288*** -0.5298
(0.1073) (0.5183)
3.5.3.3 Controlling for the Older Group
In terms of the results of years of schooling, we restrict the observations to the
children who are aged 16 years of age or older. Perhaps there are several children
who are still at school at that time. This robustness check drops the children who
are still at school at the survey year and only focuses on the graduated people. The
results are reported in Table 3.14. The results is consistent with the results in the
previous section. Therefore, the results are robust in our analysis.
Table 3.14: Robustness Check after Controlling for the Order Group
Chid Quality OLS IV
Years of Schooling -0.3833*** -1.644***
(0.0917) (0.5520)
Height -1.805*** -3.327
(0.5217) (3.725)
BMI -0.4288*** -1.0272
(0.1073) (0.6956)
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the effect of family size on children’s human capital accumula-
tion in the context of China. It has provided new evidence for testing the existence
of child Q-Q trade-off by using a recent representative data set of China. The main
challenge of the empirical studies on the effect of sibling number on child quality
is the endogeneity of family size. The one-child policy and the relaxation policy
provide us with a special opportunity to apply two stage least square method to
establish causal effects to examine this issue. The valid instrument should be cor-
related with the number of children in a family, but it does not affect the child
outcome except through family size. The eligibility for having two children is only
correlated with the family size. Therefore, the relaxation is an important source of
exogenous variation in fertility under the one-child policy. We used school enrol-
ment, completed years of schooling, height, and BMI as the measure of child quality.
As well as education, health is a crucial component of human capital. However, it
has received very little attention in the previous empirical studies.
Our findings indicate that the family size has a strong effect on improving chil-
dren’s completed years of schooling. On average, having an additional sibling is
correlated with reducing schooling by 1.3 years. However, there is no evidence for
the Q-Q trade-off when using health (height and BMI) as the measure of child qual-
ity. One of the reasons is that a lack of nutrition is not a significant concern in
China. Also, the trade-off is much weaker if school enrolment is used as the quality
measure. We suggest that the primary and junior secondary schooling are free and
the impact of parental investment is becoming weak on children’s school enrolment.
From this evidence, the existence of Q-Q trade-off is sensitive to the measure variable
of quality.
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Appendix
3.A Additional Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.1: Map of China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) Regions
Source:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/about/proj_desc/chinamap.jpg/view.
Note: The darker shaded regions in this map are the provinces in which the survey has
been conducted. Although the CHNS data is not nationally representative, it covers
both less developed provinces and coastal developed provinces. The provinces include
Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and
Shandong. The sample was expanded by adding Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing, the
three municipalities in 2011. These provinces are broadly representative of China’s
regional variation. There are two dynamic high-growth ones in east coastal region
(Jiangsu and Shandong); two northeast region (Liaoning and Heilongjiang); three middle
region (Henan, Hubei, and Hunan); and two southwest region (Guangxi and Guizhou).
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Table 3.15: Summary Statistics of CHNS Sample
CNHS Survey Years
1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011
Provinces 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 12
Observations 3,563 3,481 3,523 3,199 3,279 1,391 1,058 1,042 1,040
Figure 3.2: Total Fertility Rate in China: Urban and Rural 1950-2000
Data Source: Wang et al. (2017).
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Figure 3.3: Sex Ratio by Birth Cohorts
Data Source: Wang et al. (2017).
Figure 3.4: Primary School Enrolment Rates and Secondary School Progression
Rates
Data Source: Knight et al. (2011).
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3.B The Description of BMI
The body mass index (BMI) index is a value derived from the mass (weight) and
height of an individual. The BMI is defined as the body mass divided by the square of
the body height, and is universally expressed in units of kg/m2, resulting from mass
in kilograms and height in metres. The BMI is an attempt to quantify the amount
of tissue mass in an individual, and then categorise that person as underweight,
normal weight, overweight, or obese based on that value. Commonly accepted BMI
ranges are as follows:
Table 3.16: BMI to Weight (WHO)
BMI Meaning
Below 18.5 Underweight
18.5-24.9 Healthy weight
25 to 29.9 Above ideal range
30 to above Obese
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Chapter 4
Intergenerational Educational
Mobility, Higher Education
Expansion and Inequality
4.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades China has experienced an unprecedented rise in living
standards and rapid economic development, together with dramatic social trans-
formation (Naughton, 2007). However, the rapid economic growth has also been
accompanied by increased inequality in outcomes such as income, wealth, and ed-
ucation (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). Accordingly, there is growing concern that
the benefits of economic growth are not distributed equally. For policy-makers, it
is essential to understand whether the opportunities among individuals are equal
regardless of their initial circumstances; for example, whether children with ability
and talent from disadvantaged families are unable to move beyond the social class
of their parents on the economic ladder. Intergenerational persistence in socioeco-
nomic status is the principal mechanism through which inequality of opportunity
persists in a society.
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This study aims to use education as an indicator of socioeconomic status. Al-
though education is not the only indicator for economic status, there are a number
of reasons in using educational attainments instead of wealth or earnings. The years
of schooling are a reasonably unambiguous concept (Hertz et al., 2008). Information
on parents’ education is also more widely available than information on parental in-
comes. Moreover, the literature (Black and Devereux, 2010; Chevalier et al., 2003)
identifies that higher education usually drives greater labour market participation
and annual incomes. Understanding the nature of educational attainment across
generations can help us understand the social mobility 1. Finally, measuring educa-
tion is less prone to massive errors than measuring earnings in developing countries
(Lee, 2009). Since most individuals complete their degree by their early twenties,
life cycle biases (Grawe, 2006) are unlikely to distort estimations when compared
with permanent earnings.
Estimating the relation between educational attainments of parents and the out-
comes of their children as adults is an essential component of a society’s dynamic2.
Perfect educational mobility between two generations implies that an individual’s
educational outcome is independent of their parents’ educational levels (Breen and
Jonsson, 2005; Tansel, 2015). This is an indicator of equality of opportunity3. In-
creasing social and economic fluidity between two generations makes a society fairer
and more equal. Specifically, if a society has less intergenerational mobility, there
will be a greater impact from a family’s background on their children’s future, and
vice versa. In addition, this mobility may lead to less intergenerational equity.
Therefore, access to education is an essential policy instrument to ensure equality
of opportunity.
Concerns regarding equality of opportunities in Higher Education (HE) are grow-
1Social mobility is the movement of individuals, families, households, or other categories of
people within or between social strata in a society
2In this chapter, we interpret intergenerational correlations as mostly driven by family back-
ground effects (nurture) rather than by nature (i.e. the genetic endowment of ability).
3Black and Devereux (2010) illustrates equality of opportunity as the principal goal of a society
which poor children should have the equal opportunities for success as rich children.
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ing in developing countries. HE plays a considerable role in the prosperity of in-
dividuals and entire nations (Hill et al., 2005; Brennan et al., 2004). A review of
literature (Kane, 1999; Blanden and Machin, 2004; Haveman and Smeeding, 2006)
has investigated whether access to higher education is still related to family back-
grounds. In a highly mobile society, each cohort should have equal opportunities to
climb up the income distribution ladder, and wealth should not necessarily be in-
herited from their parents (Pekkarinen et al., 2006). Nevertheless, choices of higher
education are normally correlated with family characteristics—including education,
family resources, permanent earnings and inherited wealth (Carneiro and Heckman,
2003). Therefore, any policy capable of reducing the impact of these variables on in-
dividuals’ educational choices can be assumed to reduce inequality of opportunities.
In contrast, an increase of equality of opportunity transfers into a rise in intergen-
erational education mobility whenever parents’ education is the essential variable
characterising family background (Blanden and Machin, 2004).
In the last several decades, a remarkable expansion of HE has taken place both
in China and around the world (Altbach et al., 2010). China, as a developing
and transitional country, has experienced HE expansion reform, with the number
of new college students rising from 1.08 million in 1998 to 6.62 million in 2010.
Furthermore, the net HE enrolment ratio increased from 9.8% in 1998 to 32% in
2010, which is even higher than in some developed countries (Zhong, 2013). Many
economists and policy-makers (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1999; Downey, 2008) believe
this type of expansion raises the skill levels of individuals and labour market out-
comes, thereby improving the economic gains. However, this expansion has aroused
debates about efficiency and equality—whether increased educational opportunities
are equally distributed among students from less privileged backgrounds (Walters
and Watters, 2000; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993).
This paper attempts to address three important issues. First, what is the extent
of intergenerational mobility in educational outcomes in China? Access to recent
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national representative data in 2010 provides an opportunity to update the empirical
estimates of intergenerational educational mobility. The results are also compared
with other countries from Hertz et al. (2008) which provides a large cross-country
analysis of intergenerational correlations in educational attainment4. Second, how
such mobility has changed over birth cohorts across different policy environments?
We aim to understand the differential patterns for education mobility across genders
and regions. Finally, does the expansion of HE increase the equality of educational
opportunities? It is crucial to understand the distributed consequences of the ed-
ucation expansion and the impact of diverse family backgrounds on college oppor-
tunities. We use cohort-level analysis and a difference-in-difference (DID) model to
quantify the effects of higher education expansion on family investments by explor-
ing a natural experiment. The DID model explores the variation in the intensity
of the expansion in college numbers across regions, and applies two approaches to
estimate the effect of the education reform on family backgrounds.
The findings of the paper are as follows. First, there is a fall in intergenera-
tional educational persistence, as measured by the regression coefficient of parent’s
schooling as a predictor of children’s schooling, implying less persistence for more
recent cohorts in China. Second, intergenerational educational persistence is strong
from mothers to children, and the effect is more pronounced among daughters than
sons. Finally, the education of parents remains a strong determinant of educational
outcomes among children after education reform. Despite the benefits brought by
the expansion system, such as more opportunities to access tertiary education, these
benefits have not been distributed evenly among families, places or genders. The
4One of the most influential works about intergenerational education mobility was completed by
Hertz et al. (2008), who looked at 42 countries based on the analysis of national household surveys
over a fifty-year period. Specifically, they report the estimated coefficients from simple regressions
of a children’s education on parents’ average years of schooling. In addition, they calculate the
correlation coefficients between these two variables. Furthermore, the regression coefficient declines
for most countries over years, implying a high degree of intergenerational education mobility.
However, the correlation coefficients show no significant trends over time, despite the increased
participation in school of recent cohorts. The global average correlation between child and parent’s
schooling years was around 0.42 for the past 50 years. Rural China’s coefficient was 0.34, and the
correlation value was just 0.20 which was lower than most other countries.
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equality of HE opportunities is still a difficult task.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the rele-
vant literature on intergenerational educational mobility and the background infor-
mation on China’s HE expansion reform in 1999. Details of the data and descriptive
statistics are reported in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the corresponding em-
pirical specifications followed by Section 4.5 which discusses the empirical results,
including a number of robustness checks. Section 4.6 draws conclusion.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Intergenerational Educational Mobility
Economists have long been interested in the issue of intergenerational mobility which
is concerned with the relationship between the characteristics of parents and the out-
comes of their offspring as an adult. This can be measured in various ways—such
as through individual earnings, education level, family income, social class, or oc-
cupational status (Blanden, 2013). Education, income and occupation are the most
essential three factors in shaping an individual’s socioeconomic status. If children’s
socioeconomic outcomes are closely associated with those of their parents, it in-
dicates that children from disadvantaged families are more likely to be relatively
disadvantaged as adults; thus inequality will persist. Intergenerational equity has
received considerable attention from economists and politicians, and received plen-
tiful research from academics adopting economic and sociological perspectives.
Although the literature has widely focused on income, several social outcomes—
such as education, social class or occupation—can be used to study intergenera-
tional mobility in a society. This paper concentrates on the changes of one of these
outcomes, which is intergenerational mobility in education. The reasons why we
choose education as an indicator have been explained in the previous section. There
are several contributions on education mobility in developed countries. Shavit and
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Blossfeld (1993) produce one of the first comparative studies of intergenerational
continuity in education by studying the correlation of children’s attainments with
parental backgrounds by birth cohorts. In terms of other international comparable
estimates, Hertz et al. (2008) studied 42 nations over a fifty-year period, Checchi
(1997) three European countries, Bowles and Gintis (2002) for the United States,
and Gaviria and Sze´kely (2010) for Latin America. They conclude that parental ed-
ucation has both a direct and indirect effect on young people’s outcomes as adults.
On the other hand, according to Gang and Zimmermann (2000) who studied immi-
grant Germans, and Black et al. (2003) who studied Norway, the influence of parents
is low.
In addition to the literature concerning intergenerational patterns of educational
attainment in developed countries, studies on intergenerational educational mobility
in developing countries have also been conducted. Hnatkovska et al. (2013) examine
the intergenerational mobility in education in India by caste and find that structural
changes have coincided with a breaking down of caste barriers to social mobility.
Daude and Robano (2015) study the international mobility in education in 18 Latin
American countries and conclude the findings of Hertz et al. (2008). In China,
Knight and Shi (1996) find that the education of parents assists with schooling
years of their children in both urban and rural areas. The transmission of education
from one generation to another has a greater effect on a daughter’s education. Labar
(2011) uses an ongoing longitudinal survey of the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) to estimate the intergenerational income and educational mobility. Her
paper’s main findings are that there is upward mobility for the individuals from lower
education levels, and at the upper class there is some mobility in both directions.
4.2.2 HE Expansion and Equality of Opportunities
HE is commonly recognised as a crucial channel through which individuals move
upward in the social ladder (Gustafsson and Deng, 2006). The likelihood of access
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to HE is the leading contributor to the upward social mobility of disadvantaged
families to climb to upper social class. Unsurprisingly, education is regarded as the
primary factor in increasing social dynamics and reinforcing intergenerational mobil-
ity. Several researchers (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1994; Downey, 2008) believe that
HE expansion provides more opportunities for poorer children to get into college,
consequently increasing social equality. Other researchers (Blanden and Machin,
2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002) argue it is not clear the benefits of education
are allocated evenly across people from richer and poorer backgrounds. Indeed, if
not, education expansion may widen participation gaps between low-income and
high-income families.
One barrier to intergenerational education mobility is educational inequality.
There are two competing hypotheses about whether the higher education expansion
reform has decreased education inequality among groups differentiated by family
background. First, higher education expansion would be expected to reduce in-
equality if education is considered as a good equaliser of life opportunities between
children from advantaged and disadvantaged families, as discussed by economists
such as Downey et al. (2004) and Downey (2008). From this point of view, educa-
tion is potentially considered as an efficient instrument to narrow intergenerational
inequality (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1999). Second, empirical evidence from Smith
and Cheung (1986) and Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) illustrates that there is little
change in the “education queue” among individuals with different socioeconomic
backgrounds after an education expansion. Raftery and Hout (1993) propose the
Maximum Maintained Inequality (MMI) hypothesis that argues that socioeconom-
ically advantaged families would maximally maintain their advantages only when
enrolment is saturated there have a decrease of inequality. Therefore, intergenera-
tional inequality in education could persist, and the effect of family background will
continue despite education expansion policy and economic growth.
In developed countries, there are several empirical studies to analyse the rela-
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tionship between HE participation and equality of the educational opportunities.
Blanden and Machin (2004) indicate HE expansion has not been equally distributed
across children from rich and poor backgrounds in the UK. The expansion bene-
fited children from relatively rich families. Therefore, it widened participation gaps
between advantaged and disadvantaged children. Moreover, Blanden and Machin
(2004) report a greater impact of family background on the educational attainment
for a cohort born in 1970 compared to the 1958 cohort in Britain, concomitant with
a large increase in educational attainment especially at the tertiary level. Dearden
et al. (2011) also find that the impact of family features on educational choice has
been increased. They focus on the impact of tuition fees on higher education partici-
pation, and report an increasing proportion of pupils who are financially constrained.
Esping-Andersen (2003) notes that only in the Nordic countries has been there a
decreasing effect of parental education. Also, Ganzeboom and Treiman (1994) draw
a conclusion that education expansion could lead to a decline in the effect of father’s
education on that of his offspring.
4.2.3 Institutional Background
China has the largest number of HE students in the world. The tertiary education
system is a binary model, with three-year short-cycle colleges focusing on voca-
tional skills and regular four-year academic colleges and universities. According to
the Ministry of Education, there are 2,560 public HE institutions enrolling 26.2 mil-
lion students in 2015, including 1,219 regular HE institutions with a total enrolment
of 15.7 million, and 1,341 specialised colleges with a total enrolment of 10.4 million.
With a centralised educational system, all the HE institutions are under the con-
trol of the Ministry of Education through enrolment planning, administration, and
funding.
Since 1977, all students from high school need to take the National College En-
trance Examination (NCEE) for entrance into HE institutions at the undergraduate
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level. The initial gross college enrolment rate was extremely low, at only about
1.55% in 1978. Since the economic opening up policy in 1978, China’s economy has
been growing at a rapid rate, together with significant demand for high-skill workers
and HE graduates. Up to the early 1990s, the admission rate to college education
maintained a relatively constant growth. However, during the Asian financial crisis
in 1998, in order to drive economic growth, alleviate the unemployment, stimulate
domestic consumption and meet the tremendous demand for higher education, the
State Council decided to embark on a radical enrolment expansion plan which was
proposed by the Ministry of Education.
After December 1998, the government only took several months for the policy to
be announced and take into effect. Since the implementation of the expansion plan
in September 1999, the rate of new students entering tertiary education and college
graduates kept rising dramatically (Li et al., 2014). The college admission rate
increased by more than 30%, from 43% in 1998 to 60% in 1999, as shown in Figure
4.1. The admission rate has been kept at about 70% since then. Simultaneously,
the actual gross enrolment rate increased from less than 10% in 1998 to over 20%
in 2005. After this year, the government started to control the rapid growth of
HE enrolment, and the growth of college admission rate transformed to a relatively
steady and moderate trend. Given the unprecedented scale of the expansion, many
researchers term this radical policy a great leap forward in higher education (Shi
and Xing, 2010).
The socioeconomic context and structural changes in China’s HE help under-
stand how the reform affect social class, gender and regional inequality in attending
tertiary education. It is worth noting that students must take the national college
entrance examination where their hukou registration is located.5 Migrants to cities
must return back to their hometown to take the exam. Formal quotas of admissions
to colleges are set by the central government for each province with more places
5Hukou means household registration system. A hukou is a record in a government system of
household registration required by law, and determines where citizens are allowed to live.
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provided for students with local hukou registration than for those with hukou else-
where. Consequently, students generally attend a HE institution which is located
in the place of their hukou registration. According to Wang et al. (2007), there are
over 80% students entered to a college in their registration place. Moreover, as most
colleges and universities are in big cities or townships, there are significantly fewer
opportunities for children in rural areas. These details are relevant for the empirical
strategy of provincial variation of the DID model.
The initial goal of the college expansion reform was to increase the educational
opportunities for children from poor areas or less well educated families. Social re-
searchers and policy makers are concerned about whether this expansion has worked
as a great “equaliser” by providing more upward mobility opportunities for the young
generation who had been more disadvantaged before the reform or has exacerbated
inequality by improving access to higher education disproportionately for those who
are already privileged.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.3.1 Data Sources
The data for this study is from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), which
are nationally representative, annual longitudinal surveys of Chinese communities,
families, and individuals. it was launched in 2010 by the Institute of Social Science
Survey (ISSS) of Peking University, China. The CFPS is designed to collect indi-
vidual, household, and community level longitudinal data in contemporary China.
Since the questionnaire is planed following the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) in the US, CFPS is sometimes called the Chinese version of the PSID.
The CFPS data covers a wide range of areas for families and individuals from
162 counties in 25 provinces, including about 15,000 households. There are various
advantages in using this survey to examine intergenerational mobility. First, it
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collects information on individuals living at home and those living away. It contains
data on all household members, defined as family members who live at home and
who are not living together at the time of the survey. They are directly related
due to genetics, marriage or adoption. Thus, it overcomes the co-residing bias in
conventional household surveys by providing basic demographic and socioeconomic
information on the heads of families, their parents, spouses and children.
As the focus of this study is on the characteristics of individuals and their par-
ents, CFPS can be used to identify parent-child pairs regardless of co-residency. It
provides detailed schooling level categories ranging from between illiteracy to doc-
toral level, which facilitates the calculation of schooling years. Table 4.1 displays the
years of schooling transformed from educational categories. 6 is the age of children
to go to school. Normally the age that students are ready to enter to college is 18
or 19. The sample size is large—it contains approximately 15,000 households and
covers most of the provinces in China. Finally, we are using more recent data (from
2010) compared to other datasets. It contains more observations after the education
reforms that took place in 1999.
Table 4.1: Educational Level Used in the Analysis
Education Level Years of Education Age
Illiterate and Semi-illiterate 0 -
Primary School 6 6-12
Junior School 9 12-15
Senior High School 12 15-18
College and above 15+ 18+
4.3.2 Summary Statistics of Sample
In our analysis, the sample includes the young generation who were born before 1987
and had already completed school in the survey year 2010. In China, the standard
age for graduation from the colleges or university is 22 or 23. Therefore, we focus on
75
those in the sample born between 1970 to 1986. Their educational outcomes were
not affected by the Cultural Revolution during the period between 1966 to 1976.
All target participants went to school after this period. Individuals under the age
of 23 are excluded to avoid the students who were still at college in the survey year.
Moreover, we restricted the sample to all of the younger generations, who entered
college after 1978. The main schools and national colleges were reopened after the
Culture Revolution with admission based on academic achievements.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Variables All Male Female
Children′sOutcomes
Age 32.114 31.989 32.261
(5.138) (5.115) (5.161)
Gender 0.541 1 0
(0.498)
Schooling years 8.580 8.947 8.147
(4.595) (4.296) (4.888)
Education proportion(%)
Below Primary 13.87 10.25 18.14
Primary School 21.26 21.07 21.49
Junior School 34.63 37.41 31.35
Senior High School 14.40 15.32 13.33
3 Year College 8.74 8.83 8.63
4 Year University and above 7.10 7.13 7.06
Background
Father’s age 61.300 61.219 61.397
(8.666) (8.609) (8.733)
Father’s schooling years 5.801 5.709 5.909
(4.527) (4.561) (4.483)
Mother’s age 58.780 58.731 58.839
(8.107) (8.056) (8.168)
Mother’s schooling years 3.688 3.439 3.981
(4.293) (4.283) (4.287)
Observations 12476 6759 5716
Table 4.2 presents parents and child data including age, schooling years and
education level. Compared to fathers, mothers are slightly younger and have fewer
average schooling years. In terms of the younger generation, while both boys and
girls have higher educational levels than their parents, male children have more
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years of schooling than female. This is largely due to Chinese families’ preference
for investing in sons rather than daughters, especially in rural areas (Liu, 2007).
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 present data in terms of correlation between the parents’
and the children’s education. The numbers 1-5 represent below primary, primary
school, junior middle school, senior middle school and higher education. These
numbers show the proportion of children’s education according to the father’s or
mother’s education. For example, if the father’s education is below primary school
(father’s education=1), there are around 30% of children who had below primary
schooling (children’s education=1). If the father’s education is primary school or
junior school, the largest proportion for children’s education is at level 3 (children’s
education=junior middle school). In contrast, if the father’s education is senior
middle school or higher education, the largest proportion is at level 5 (children’s
education=higher education).
Table 4.3: Correlation between Father’s Education and Children’s Education
Children’s Education
1 2 3 4 5
1 29.65% 29.09% 29.42% 7.28% 4.56%
Father’s 2 9.61% 24.64% 41.63% 14.35% 9.78%
Education 3 4.55% 14.36% 38.22% 20.13% 22.72%
4 3.01% 10.22% 30.47% 20.90% 35.39%
5 8.00% 8.60% 16.00% 17.80% 49.60%
Table 4.4: Correlation between Mother’s Education and Children’s Education
Children’s Education
1 2 3 4 5
1 22.17% 27.80% 33.76% 9.66% 6.61%
Mother’s 2 6.25% 19.99% 40.98% 17.81% 14.97%
Education 3 1.81% 7.44% 35.72% 23.52% 31.50 %
4 0.99% 5.34% 20.99% 21.12% 51.55%
5 3.57% 13.95% 17.44% 12.02% 53.02%
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As well as the main data of CFPS, the China Education Year Book and Statistics
Yearbook of China have been used in the regression to provide information about the
provincial level data as regional control variables. The China Education Year Book
provides a clear overview of educational development during the past decades,such
as that of high school graduates. The Statistics Yearbook consists of summary data
on national economy and social development, such as income growth rate per capita,
which we use as a regional control variable. These two datasets are useful to link
regional information with individual characteristics.
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics of HE Reform
China started to expand its HE system in 1999. In December 1998, the government
had a target of increasing HE participation (Ministry of Education of the People’s
Republic of China, 1998). The government has emphasised mass education with
policies aimed at increasing the educational opportunities of children from poor
areas, or the less well educated. In May 1999, the decision has been made to start
the expansion immediately at the start of the 1999 to 2000 academic year that begins
in September (Liu, 2007). As a consequence, the number of new college students
rose by 40% in 1999, in comparison with 1998. Between 1998 and 2005, the number
of students admitted to college more than quadrupled.
The following two figures use national data from the National Bureau of Statistics
of China to demonstrate the effect of the HE reform. Figure 4.1 illustrates that,
from 1999, the students of HE enrolment increased dramatically, and the proportion
of students that entered college in their province increased as well. The red line
represents the gross enrolment ratio which is the number of actual students enrolled
over the number of potential students aged 19. The green line shows the proportion
of high school graduates to enter college, which is the number of students actually
enrolled at college over the total number of senior high school graduates. Although
the percentage of high school graduates entering to college is relatively large (80%),
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the gross enrolment ratio is still low, due principally to the lack of opportunity for
children, particularly those in rural areas, to go to high school.
Moreover, it is clear that college participation increased dramatically between
1998 and 1999. After that, the scale of HE kept rising. Nearly 80% of high school
graduates entered college in 2005. This number is over twice that in 1998. At the
same time, the gross enrolment rate grew to 30%, which is also more than twice
the 1998 figure. In the next section, we analyse how this rapid change affects the
education opportunity of different individuals by family backgrounds. First we will
compare cohorts: how does the intergenerational mobility in education shifts over
time across different policy environments? It is worth noting that individuals in
China normally go to a college that is located in the province of their place of birth.
A large proportion of admissions (generally over 80%) is allocated to middle school
students who are registered in the province where the university is located. This
allows us to use regional differences in access to higher education as an additional
identification strategy.
Figure 4.1: Higher Education Enrolment
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the number of colleges expanded from 1,000 in
1998 to 1,800 in 2005. The line is almost flat before 1998, which indicates that
there is not much variation before the reform; however, it is evident that, after
1999, the line illustrates rapid growth of college numbers. As has been pointed
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Figure 4.2: Number of Colleges
out from the two figures, certain parts of HE enlarged continuously, especially with
regards number of new students enrolling and college establishment numbers after
the education expansion. We run a regression of college enrolment on number of
colleges using provincial data with two-way fixed effects of province and years. We
find a significant correlation between the increase in the number of colleges and
the rise in higher education registrations. Therefore, it is important to analyse the
effects of expansion reform in terms of enrolment and the number of colleges.
Table 4.5: Children’s Education before and after Education Policy
Children’s Education(%) Control group Treatment group
Below Primary 17.55% 7.41%
Primary 23.73% 16.92%
Junior School 34.08% 35.58%
High School 13.21% 16.50%
3 Year College 6.68% 12.35%
4 Year College and above 4.75% 11.23%
Observations 8040 4575
Table 4.5 shows the percentages of children being educated at each level 6. Mem-
6There is a significant reduction in the lowest two categories. The main reason is that China
implemented the compulsory education. The law on compulsory education, which took effect on
1986, requires all citizens to attend school for at least nine years. These nine years consist of six
years of primary education and three years of junior middle school. At the same time, the higher
education expansion also motivated more children to enter school.
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bership of treatment and control groups is determined by ages, which are exogenous.
Therefore, all young generations are separated into two groups depending on their
ages. The treatment group took college entrance examinations after the education
expansion in their province, while the control group took the exams before the educa-
tion reform. After the HE policy, the percentage accessing college rose dramatically
to 23.5% from 11.43% prior to reform. This clearly demonstrates that the policy
has an effect on the college enrolment probability. In the next section we analyse
the likelihood of entering college, and the effects that policies had on changes to
intergenerational educational mobility.
4.4 Empirical Specifications
4.4.1 Intergenerational Educational Mobility
Several researchers, such as Hertz et al. (2008) have examined the effect of the av-
erage years of parents’ education level on the children’s schooling years. Others can
distinguish the effects of father’s and mother’s education on the son’s and daugh-
ter’s education. Following these literature, regress the Equation 4.1 with children’s
schooling years on their parents’ schooling years to explore the educational mobility
for China as a whole over the past two decades and also examine the pattern for
different cohorts, regions and genders.
edchildi = α0 + α1ed
parents
i + αXZi + ξi (4.1)
where edchildi is the schooling years of a child i, ed
parents
i is the parental years of
schooling, Zi is a vector of the control variables, including children’s age, gender,
parents’ age, region. α1 picks up the education association across generations. The
regressions are estimated for the entire sample and separately for the sons and
daughters samples. In order to analyse the changes over time, we also analyse the
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regressions separately for the age cohort before education and after education reform
in 4.4.2.
As discussed previously, Hertz et al. (2008) examine the intergenerational edu-
cation correlation as follows. They refer to the regression coefficient as measures of
“grade persistence”, and the correlations as measures of “standardised persistence”.
Intergenerational education correlationρ = α1 ∗ (σparents/σchildren) (4.2)
where σparents and σchildren are the standard deviations of years of schooling of parents
and children respectively. The correlation coefficient is “standardised” by the ratio
of the standard deviations for the two generations. It can be used to measure the
intergenerational educational persistence in a society. ρ and α1 do not establish the
causality; however, they quantify the persistence of educational inequality from one
generation to the next. In terms of educational mobility across generations, lower
value of ρ and α1 associates with greater mobility.
Checchi et al. (2013) argue that a change in ρ captures not only a change in
the parent–child education correlation, but also other events in the education sys-
tem, such as the expansion of compulsory primary education or higher education
expansion. To disentangle the effects of these events from the educational corre-
lation between parents and children, they propose decomposing ρ into three com-
ponents: changes in the dispersion of the educational attainment of parents and
children around the respective means, changes in children’s educational attainment
conditional on the educational attainment of the parents, and changes in the uncon-
ditional distribution of parental educational attainment. They argue that changes
in children’s schooling conditional on parent’s education is the most relevant for
policy. In this paper, we use several specifications to identify the expansion effects
on intergenerational educational mobility.
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4.4.2 The Trend of Intergenerational Mobility in Education
While many studies of intergenerational mobility and status persistence are avail-
able, this section provides estimates of 20-year trends in two measures of intergen-
erational persistence–the coefficient from a regression of children’s schooling against
that of their parents, and the correlation between these two. In order to analyse
the coefficients and correlations of changes over time, we run the regressions sep-
arately for each five-year birth cohort in equation 4.3 and equation 4.4. It covers
recent four cohorts who were born in 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984 and 1985-
1989. The estimates are derived from a OLS regression in which the dependent
variable is children’s schooling years and the main explanatory variable is the par-
ents’ average education. α1 measures the effect of an additional year of parents’
average education on their children’s education, while ρ is the correlation between
two variables. A five-year span can ensure that we have sufficient observations to
regress; furthermore, it is short enough to observe the changes.
ed
child(5)
i = α0 + α1ed
parents
i + αXZi + ξi (4.3)
and
ρ(5) = α1 ∗ (σparents/σchildren) (4.4)
As mentioned in subsection 4.3.3, China’s education expansion started in 1999.
The government decided to enlarge the scale of colleges and higher education en-
rolment. The government has emphasised mass education with policies aiming to
increase the educational opportunities for children from the poor areas or the less
well educated. In theory, the policy should reduce the intergenerational transmis-
sion of education. In this section, we also compare the changes of intergenerational
mobility in education over birth cohorts across different policy environments. We
estimate in cohorts 1970-1979 and 1980-1989 respectively to examine the trend in
the intergenerational educational mobility. Before the education reform, the early
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cohorts are the individuals who aged between 33 to 42 years old. The later co-
horts are the individuals who are aged 23 to 32, who all entered colleges after the
higher education reform. The regressions are also run by gender before and after
the education policy.
4.4.3 HE Expansion and Educational Inequality
4.4.3.1 Cohort-level Analysis
The higher education expansion policy in 1999 can be regarded as a natural ex-
periment. Due to the expansion, students taking college entrance exam before and
after the education reform have different probabilities of going to college. As this
probability mainly depends on individuals’ birth year, which is exogenous, we sep-
arate all people into two groups depending on their ages. The treatment groups
are those cohorts who were born after and in 1980 who entered colleges after the
higher education policy. The control groups are the individuals who were born
before 1980 and took college exam after 1998. However, the policy did not affect
the whole population homogeneously as family background and financial constraints
also played an important role. We evaluate the effects of increased higher education
opportunities promoted by the reform on equality of education opportunities and
intergenerational educational mobility by exploiting the variation in cohort level and
number of colleges caused by the expansion reform.
First, we use micro-data from the Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS) in 2010
to observe probability of attending college by birth cohort. The expansion point has
also shown in the CFPS sample. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the possibility of attending
college for males and females by birth year. The vertical lines delineate the effects
of education expansion for those cohorts born after 1980. There is a measurement
error due to the difference between the academic year and the calendar year. The
new schooling year starts in September in China; however, our data do not have
the information about individuals’ month of birth. After 1980, the slope is much
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bigger than the number before the policy. Although probability of attendance is
rising prior to reform, the pace of change accelerates indicating the reform had the
expected effect.
Figure 4.3: Probability of Attending College by Birth Cohort
Our aim is to estimate the effect of education expansion on college enrolment rate
and intergenerational educational mobility for the affected cohorts. The education
expansion took place during several birth cohorts. The change in education is not
a significant jump as expected with a traditional Regression Discontinuity (RD).
The education system where it acts as ‘a benign dictator’ to impose homogeneity
across the system such that the quality of education is comparable for all individuals
and independent of family background. In such a world, all children have identical
opportunity and thus mobility should be high. The empirical strategy is to use the
cohort-level variation in children’s probability of higher education enrolment rate
and intergenerational educational mobility.
To start with answering the third question from Section 4.1 which is “how
the education policies affecting HE opportunities of different cohort-level individ-
uals?”. Devereux and Fan (2011) who examine the research on cohort-level vari-
ation in schooling years and labour market outcomes in Britain, group cohorts as
pre-expansion, during-expansion and post-expansion. Similarly we conduct cohort
analysis by exploiting the different time exposure to each wave. The pre-expansion
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cohorts include individuals who were born before 1980. The post-expansion cohorts
are those born after 1980. Figure 4.1 displays a jump between 1998 and 1999 when
the policy began. In order to compare the policy effects, the probability of attending
college is estimated by the function of cohorts. The specification is as follows,
EDcit = a+
86∑
t=70
αtCOHORTt + γprovince + εit (4.5)
where i and t denote the individual and birth cohorts, respectively. EDcit repre-
sents whether the individual attends college or not 7. These coefficients αt for the
cohort dummies measure increased probability of attending college relative to base-
line year. The 1970 cohort is the baseline year and the omitted category. γprovince
is the province fixed effect. Provincial fixed effect captures regional time-invariant
unobservables. The location is important because college distributions might vary
in different places. For instance, the big cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin) and
some coastal provinces might have more educational resources and opportunities of
attending colleges. Province will not affect bias, but controlling for it will improve
precision.
In addition to the higher education enrolment from education reform by cohort,
we explore the distributional consequences of the expansion by family background.
The baseline specification for estimating intergenerational educational mobility is
to interact cohort with the family background in education. We use father’s school-
ing years and mother’s years of education as the family background to identify the
changes in intergenerational educational mobility before and after education expan-
sion.
edcit = a+
86∑
t=70
αtcohortt + βted
p
it +
86∑
t=70
δt(cohortt ∗ edpit) + γprovince + εit (4.6)
7Angrist and Pischke (2008) discussed a nonlinear model may fit the CEF for LDVs more closely
than a linear model; however, when it comes to marginal effects, this probably matters little. This
optimistic conclusion is not a theorem, but, as in the empirical example, it seems to be fairly true.
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where edcit indicates whether the individual attends college. ed
p
it is the schooling
years of parents respectively. We use both father’s education level and mother’s ed-
ucation level separately to estimate the equation. The coefficient δt is the parameter
of interest which indicates the interaction between birth cohort, including treatment
and control group, and family educational background. It captures the changes in
parent-child educational relationship. γprovince is the province fixed effect. Further-
more, the regressions are clustered by year of birth. With the changes of birth
cohort, we concentrate on the interaction coefficients between parents’ education
and birth cohorts.
The above equations examine the effects of the higher education policy on inter-
generational persistence by cohorts. We decide to apply “before” and “after” model
to understand the changes across different policy environments. The cohorts before
and in 1980 are treated as policy-off and children born after 1980 are considered as
policy-on. We ran a regression using “before” and “after” where policy-on started
in 1999. As seen in the equation below, ‘Policy’ is a dummy variable coded 1 if the
individual graduated from high school after 1998 (cohort 81 to 86) and 0 if they
graduated in or before 1998 (cohort 71 to 80). The specification controls for both
general trend and impact of the policy.
edcit = α0 + α1ed
p
it + α2policy + α3ed
p
it ∗ policy + α4cohortt ∗ policy + α5cohortt
+γprovince + εit
(4.7)
where edcit indicates that whether children attend college and ed
p
it is the schooling
years of parents. The interaction coefficient α3 is the differential effect of policy-on
by family education background, which we are most interested in. The coefficient
α4 is the interaction between the policy and birth cohort which can capture the
time trend in the impact on children’s education. cohortt is the birth cohort fixed
effect. What is shown to be important in γprovince is the region of residence fixed
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effect. εit is an error term. This methodology provides estimates about the changes
of intergenerational persistence before and after the higher education expansion;
however, the “before” and “after” model can not distinguish policy effect from macro
trends, we will use a difference-in-difference approach and the provincial variation
to identify the effects of the higher education policy on intergenerational persistence
in the next section.
4.4.3.2 Difference-in-Difference Approach
The difference-in-difference model explores the mechanisms behind the expansion
policy’s effects by examining individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic. In 1999,
Chinese colleges started to expand their supply by opening new sites and by offering
more enrolment in higher education. The “quasi-randomness” of higher education
expansion with respect to potential demand is key to our identifying strategy. Col-
leges pursued different strategies to expand supply. For example, colleges, concen-
trated in the largest cities, expanded the supply to small cities. Some colleges set
up new campus in different locations in order to increase enrolment. The provincial
governments had more control and ownership of the higher education institution.
In fact, the supply was not affected by factors influencing both supply and demand
or by potential demand.
A more robust approach comes from an unexpected increase in the number of
colleges after 1999. Consequently, we exploit variation in the intensity of the expan-
sion in the number of colleges between provinces to evaluate individuals’ education
outcomes and parents-children correlation. The expansion is mainly measured in
terms of new college sites opened. The number of colleges positively correlates with
enrolment in higher education (see Figure 4.8 4.9 4.10, 4.11 in the appendix) 8. We
link individual educational attainment with region-level data from the China Edu-
cational Statistics Yearbook to the magnitude of the increase in regional higher ed-
8The enrolment in higher education is another measure of the high education expansion. These
graphs show the positive correlation.
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ucation expansion supply. While age cohort determines treatment status, treatment
intensity is measured by the size of supply expansion by the region of residences
The main methodology follows Duflo (2002)’s paper which evaluates the effect
of the primary school construction programme on education and wages using the
difference in difference model. The identification strategy in her paper is based on
the fact that exposure to the school construction programme varied by region of
birth and date of birth. The later research by Bratti et al. (2008) exploits regional
variations in the intensity of the higher education expansion to produce a natural
experiment in their difference in difference model. Building upon their work, we
also use differences in exposure to the education reform and different intensities of
expansion based on number of colleges to estimate the following equation:
edcit = α0 + α1ed
p
it + α2Zi + α3(ed
p
it ∗ policyi ∗∆supply) + α4(policyi ∗∆supply)
+α5(Regionvar ∗ policyi) + α6(Pre− supply ∗ cohort) + βprovince + γcohort + εit
(4.8)
where edcit indicates the children’s educational outcomes of attending college for
individual i who were born in province p at time t. βprovince is the regional fixed
effect and γcohort is the birth cohort fixed effect. α0 is a constant. ∆supplyp denotes
the increase in the number of colleges available during the education expansion
period between 1998 and 2005. Pre-supply is the number of colleges in 1998, which is
just before the expansion. The binary variable captures the difference in educational
achievements for cohorts before and after the 1999 reform.
Zi is a vector of individual characteristics including gender, father’s age, mother’s
age, children’s age and the dimension of family background that is not interacted
with the policy dummy and the increase in supply. At the provincial level,Regionvar
is a vector of the regional control variables for the period 1999-2005. εit is the
stochastic error term that can be correlated within region and cohort. The standard
errors are clustered by province and birth cohort. The regional control variables in-
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cluding number of high school graduates, tuition fees, and budgetary expenditures
per student in higher education institution were collected from the China Education
Year Books. Provincial fixed effects capture regional time-invariant unobservables
while the cohort fixed effects capture provincial level time trends in the demand for
higher education. While the treatment status is determined by birth cohort, treat-
ment intensity is determined by the size of supply expansion measured at regional
level.
The above equation shows the interaction between family background and the
post-reform dummy. This is parallel with the “before” and “after” strategy in the
previous section. The interaction between higher education supply at the provincial
level and parents’ education is the differential effect of higher education supply by
family background captured by the coefficient α3. In terms of changes in supply,
the following Figure 4.4 and Table 4.6 show the intensity of education expansion
from number of colleges. We use “the increase in number of colleges from 1998 to
2005 divided by the potential students aged 19” as the ∆supply.
Figure 4.4: Changes of Number of Colleges by Province
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Table 4.6: Intensity of HE Expansion by Province (College number)
Region/Province 1998 2005 Changes 1998-2005
Beijing 63 77 14
Tianjin 20 42 22
Hebei 46 86 40
Shanxi 23 59 36
Liaoning 61 76 15
Jilin 41 44 3
Heilongjiang 38 62 24
Shanghai 40 58 18
Jiangsu 66 114 48
Zhejiang 32 68 36
Anhui 34 81 47
Fujian 29 53 24
Jiangxi 31 67 36
Shandong 49 59 50
Henan 51 83 32
Hubei 54 85 31
Hunan 47 93 46
Guangdong 22 35 13
Guangxi 28 51 23
Chongqing 22 35 13
Sichuan 43 68 25
Guizhou 20 34 14
Yunnan 26 44 18
Shannxi 42 72 30
Gansu 17 33 16
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Intergenerational Educational Mobility
To establish the extent of intergenerational mobility in education, first, we run the
regression edchildi on ed
parents
i without including other covariates. We use the average
years of the education of mother and father as a measure of parental education.
Table 4.7 provides details of OLS regressions predicting children’s education as a
function of average years schooling years of both of them. In all the regressions,
the coefficients are positive and significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The
equation with parents’ average education produced the coefficient 0.598. When
parents’ years schooling increase 1, children’s education increases 0.598. In relation
to the 42 countries in Hertz et al. (2008), this coefficient ranks just below the middle
(see Figure 4.12 in the appendix).
Table 4.7: Intergenerational Educational Mobility by Gender
Dependent Variable: Children’s schooling
All Sons Daughters
Parents’ schooling years 0.5982*** 0.5232*** 0.6842***
(0.0094) (0.0123) (0.0141)
Male of child 0.9766*** - -
(0.0691)
Age of child -0.1459*** -0.1029*** -0.1945***
(0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0152)
Age of father -0.0126 -0.0230* 0.0002
(0.0096) (0.0127) (0.0147)
Age of mother 0.0467*** 0.0487*** 0.4310***
(0.0105) (0.0138) (0.0159)
Observations 12469 6757 5712
R-squared 0.3017 0.2467 0.3555
In the separate male and female regression in Table 4.8, the daughters’ sample
has higher coefficients than those in the sons’ sample which indicates that female
children are more dependent on family investment. The coefficient for sons is 0.5232,
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Table 4.8: Coefficients and Correlation by Gender
(1) (2)
Coefficient α1 Correlation ρ
All 0.5982*** 0.5028***
(0.0094) (0.0079)
Sons 0.5232*** 0.4674***
(0.0123) (0.0109)
Daughters 0.6842*** 0.5434***
(0.0141) (0.0112)
Observation 12469 12469
which is much lower than that for daughters (0.6842). This difference suggests that
the effect of family background on children’s education is stronger for daughters
than for sons. In China, especially in the rural area, a son takes more responsibility
for his parents when they are old (Hannum et al., 2009). Therefore, parents prefer
to invest more in their son’s education. It should be that those from lower income
backgrounds invest differently in sons. The correlations which is a standardised
measure of intergenerational educational persistence are lower than the coefficients.
4.5.2 The Trend for Intergenerational Mobility in Educa-
tion
In order to analyse the coefficients of changes over time, we run the regressions
separately for each five-year birth cohort. It covers recent four cohorts: 1970-1974,
1975-1979, 1980-1984 and 1985-1989. The estimates are derived from a OLS regres-
sion in which the dependent variable is children’s schooling years and the explanatory
variable is the parents’ average education. Table 4.9 and Figure 4.5 show the trend
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of regression coefficients and correction coefficients. The coefficients are decreasing
from 1975-1979 cohorts. As the individuals born in 1975-1979 and 1980-1984, it is
possible for the education expansion policy to reduce the coefficient. The individuals
who were born in 1980 are the first groups to experience the education expansion.
The falling coefficients indicate a decrease in the measure of the intergenerational
persistence of educational inequality. However, we do not observe any such trend
in the correlation between parents and child schooling. The results are consistent
with the results from Hertz et al. (2008) (see Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 in the
appendix).
Table 4.9: Coefficient and Correlation by Cohort
(1) (2)
Coefficient α1 Correlation ρ
Cohort 70-74 0.5992*** 0.4770***
(0.0179) (0.0143)
Cohort 75-79 0.6314*** 0.5147***
(0.0185) (0.0168)
Cohort 80-84 0.5696*** 0.5147***
(0.0165) (0.0149)
Cohort 85-89 0.5690*** 0.5177***
(0.0165) (0.0150)
Observation 12469 12469
In the next part, we compare intergenerational educational persistence before and
after the higher education expansion environments. From Table 4.10, the coefficient
of the whole sample slightly decreases. In detail, it seems the higher education policy
has stronger positive effects on daughters. The coefficient of the intergenerational
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Figure 4.5: Regression Coefficient and Correlation by Cohorts
mobility for sons remains unchanged. In this section, we can observe the trend about
the intergenerational persistence in terms of coefficient and correlation. In the next
section, we will explore more about the effects of the higher education expansion on
intergenerational education persistence.
Table 4.10: Coefficients and Correlation by HE Reform
(1) (2)
Early Cohort Late Cohort
All 0.6099*** 0.5832***
(0.0122) (0.0143)
Sons 0.5271*** 0.5274***
(0.0163) (0.0189)
Daughters 0.6998*** 0.6556***
(0.01831) (0.0218)
Observation 7923 4546
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4.5.3 HE Expansion and Educational Inequality
4.5.3.1 Cohort-level Variation
Table 4.11 estimates the coefficients for the control and treatment groups. It quan-
tifies the findings of Figure 4.3 by regressing the education attainment variables on
birth cohorts in each year. We report results for the percentages of higher education
enrolment, not years of schooling because access to tertiary education is more likely
to be dependent on family background than other levels of schooling. The expansion
has a direct effect on children’s college enrolment. The policy of education expan-
sion should increase children’s years of education, including primary and secondary
schooling.
The results illustrate positive and significant coefficients for cohort dummies.
Moreover, the treatment cohorts are significantly more likely to enter higher edu-
cation than the control groups who were born before the reform. For instance, the
individuals born in 1986 were about 19 per cent more likely to attend college than
those born in 1970. The growth rate during cohort 81/82 (0.05%) and later cohort
is relatively larger than those before the reform, such as cohort 75/76 (0.02%) and
cohort 78/79 (0.02%). In order to observe the difference between two constant co-
efficients, we report all the coefficients in Figure 4.6. It is evident that the slope is
much larger after 1980 than before, indicating that policy effects operate in addition
to a linear time trend. Therefore, it is also worth analysing the policy effects on
higher education enrolment by family background.
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Table 4.11: Effects of HE Expansion on Proportion with a College Degree
Proportion with a College Degree
Cohort71 0.0009*
(0.0011)
Cohort72 0.0204***
(0.0004)
Cohort73 -0.0002
(0.0006)
Cohort74 0.0223***
(0.0006)
Cohort75 0.0345***
(0.0010)
Cohort76 0.0562***
(0.201)
Cohort77 0.0422***
(0.0013)
Cohort78 0.0467***
(0.0008)
Cohort79 0.0712***
(0.0012)
Cohort80 0.0647***
(0.0013)
Cohort81 0.0686***
(0.0016)
Cohort82 0.1152***
(0.0022)
Cohort83 0.1445***
(0.0011)
Cohort84 0.1726***
(0.0010)
Cohort85 0.1748***
(0.0008)
Cohort86 0.1879***
(0.0009)
Observations 12621
R-squared 0.0953
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010. The omitted cohort
dummy variable is the first cohort 1970. Robust stan-
dard errors in brackets with clustering by year of birth.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Figure 4.6: Coefficients of Probability of Attending HE by Birth Cohort
In addition, we are interested in whether the policy effects differ based on gender.
Several previous studies imply that the higher education reform has brought about
different educational opportunities for male and female students. For example, there
is some evidence that higher education in China has narrowed the gender gap in
terms of college access (Wu and Zhang, 2010). It is also interesting to note that,
female students took more advantage of expanded opportunities in higher education.
Figure 4.3 shows that a higher percentage of women than men attend college born
after 1980. Therefore, it is essential to use the same methodology to estimate the
educational attainment by gender.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.12 illustrate the estimated coefficients of the percent-
age of men and women respectively attending higher education. Firstly, we observe
positive and significant coefficients for most of the cohorts. Furthermore, the trend
is upward, as the coefficients increase for most of the cohorts. The later cohorts have
relatively larger increasing coefficients year by year. In addition, the effect of higher
education is also significantly greater for women, as shown in the 21 per cent rise for
women in cohort 1986 compared with baseline. Figure 4.7 shows all the coefficients
for the probability of attending higher education by birth cohort and gender.
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Table 4.12: Effects of HE Expansion on Proportion Attended College by Gender
Independent Variables Male Female
Cohort71 0.0011 0.0032**
(0.0020) (0.0015)
Cohort72 0.0135*** 0.0296***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Cohort73 0.0002* -0.0018**
(0.0015) (0.0007)
Cohort74 0.0349*** 0.0133***
(0.0015) (0.0012)
Cohort75 0.0257*** 0.0447***
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Cohort76 0.0357*** 0.0778***
(0.0019) (0.0014)
Cohort77 0.0494*** 0.0332***
(0.0019) (0.0015)
Cohort78 0.0452*** 0.0477***
(0.0007) (0.0018)
Cohort79 0.0836*** 0.0571***
(0.0020) (0.0012)
Cohort80 0.0536*** 0.0759***
(0.0022) (0.0016)
Cohort81 0.0545*** 0.0837***
(0.0017) (0.0023)
Cohort82 0.1010*** 0.1335***
(0.0021) (0.0028)
Cohort83 0.1323*** 0.1594***
(0.0023) (0.0015)
Cohort84 0.1572*** 0.1924***
(0.0009) (0.0024)
Cohort85 0.1718*** 0.1782***
(0.0014) (0.0024)
Cohort86 0.1687*** 0.2104***
(0.0010) (0.0016)
Observations 6823 5797
R-squared 0.0843 0.1124
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010.The omitted co-
hort dummy variable is the first cohort 1970. Robust
standard errors in brackets with clustering by year of
birth.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Figure 4.7: Coefficients of Probability of Attending HE by Birth Cohort and Gender
According to equation 4.6, we regress the interaction with father’s education and
mother’s education separately and obtain the results in Table 4.13 as follows. The
coefficient of mother’s education (0.0246) is larger than father’s (0.0177). When a
mother has one more year schooling, her children are 2.5 per cent more likely to
attend college. It also reveals children’s education attainments are more related to
mother’s education background, than to father’s education. The majority of the
interaction coefficients between parents’ educational years and children’s exposure
to the policy which were captured by the birth cohort remains positive after edu-
cation expansion. The most positive interaction estimator δt implies that parental
educational background has not lost impact on the possibility of going to college
after the policy. It also indicates, compared to pre-expansion cohorts, the post-
expansion cohorts even increases the child-parent correlation. Consequently, the
positive correlation causes a more persistent intergenerational educational immobil-
ity. However, the policy effect has not been quantified. We decided to run regression
with policy-on and policy-off as two groups with time trend and policy effect.
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Table 4.13: Coefficients of the Interaction with Parents’ Schooling years
With mother’s schooling years With father’s schooling years
Parents’ education 0.0246*** 0.0177***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Cohort71 -0.0011*** -0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Cohort72 -0.0033*** 0.0016***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Cohort73 -0.0093*** -0.0058***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Cohort74 -0.0045*** -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0002)
Cohort75 0.0004 0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Cohort76 0.0024*** 0.0075***
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Cohort77 0.0052*** 0.0032***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Cohort78 -0.0003 -0.0006*
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Cohort79 -0.0027*** 0.0098***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Cohort80 -0.0003* 0.0029***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Cohort81 -0.0013*** -0.0022***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Cohort82 0.0032*** 0.0068***
(0.0023) (0.0002)
Cohort83 -0.0007 0.0080***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Cohort84 0.0074*** 0.0083***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Cohort85 0.0068*** 0.0157***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Cohort86 -0.0076*** 0.0109***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 12476 12476
R-squared 0.1732 0.1624
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010.Robust standard errors in brackets with clustering by
year of birth.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Table 4.14 reports estimates from equation 4.7 demonstrating that policy has a
strongly positive relationship with children’s education attainments. Family back-
ground and percentage of children entering college remain strongly correlated. More-
over, the positive interaction coefficients between policy and parents’ educational
attainment α3 suggest that the parent-children correlation has increased. The high-
education families benefit most from the education reform. This is probably because
the marginal effects of educational policy expansion tends to be strongest on indi-
viduals whose parents are well educated. Parents with the high education level earn
higher salaries and invest more in children’s education. Therefore, the education
policy does not change much for the children from disadvantaged families. This
indicates that parental educational background still has the apparent influence on
children’s educational outcome and that education expansion leads to more persis-
tent intergenerational education immobility.
Table 4.14: The Effects of Expansion on IGM (Ed)
With father’s education With mother’s education
Father’s/Mother’s education 0.0190*** 0.0232***
(0.0012) (0.0010)
Policy*Parents’ education 0.0075*** 0.0056***
(0.0022) (0.0018)
Birth cohort*Policy 0.0130*** 0.0106***
(0.0041) (0.0033)
Observations 12476 12476
R-squared 0.1590 0.1707
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010. Robust standard errors in brackets with clustering by
year of birth. Also with province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects. IGM (Intergenera-
tional Mobility)
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
In Table 4.15 and Table 4.16, we estimate the effect of the policy by gender. It is
important to analyse which gender benefits more from the policy. It seems women
obtain greater benefit from the education policy from both tables. The coefficients
of birth cohort*policy (0.0147 in Table 4.15 and 0.0120 in Table 4.16) show women
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benefit more than men (0.0122 in Table 4.15 and 0.0099 in Table 4.16) from the
policy. At the same time, we find the effect of the policy in the interaction coef-
ficient between policy and family background (policy*father’s/mother’s education)
is higher for women (0.0108 in Table 4.15 and 0.0084 in Table 4.16) than for men
(0.0050 in Table 4.15 and 0.0032 in Table 4.16). Comparing these two tables, the
effect of the father’s education on intergenerational mobility is stronger than those
with the mother’s education.
Table 4.15: The Effects of HE Expansion on IGM (Ed) with Father’s Education
Son’s education outcome Daughter’s education outcome
Father’s education 0.0192*** 0.0189***
(0.0012) (0.0013)
Policy*Father’ education 0.0050** 0.0108***
(0.0024) (0.0026)
Birth cohort*Policy 0.0122*** 0.0147***
(0.0048) (0.0037)
Observations 6758 5716
R-squared 0.3399 0.1821
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010. Robust standard errors in brackets with clustering by year
of birth. Also with province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
Table 4.16: The Effects of Expansion on IGM (Ed) with Mother’s Education
Son’s education outcome Daughter’s education outcome
Mother’s education 0.0231*** 0.0239***
(0.0012) (0.0016)
Policy*Mother’ education 0.0032* 0.0084***
(0.0022) (0.0017)
Birth cohort*Policy 0.0099** 0.0120***
(0.0043) (0.0028)
Observations 6759 5716
R-squared 0.1510 0.3278
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010. Robust standard errors in brackets with clustering by year
of birth. Also with province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Consequently, women obtain greater benefit from education policy than men.
This finding is supported by a number of studies, which confirm that higher educa-
tion expansion has narrowed the gender gap in college access (Wu and Zhang, 2010).
Our finding also indicates that although Chinese families’ preference for investing
more in boys’ education than girls, the expansion policy has reduced the gender gap
by providing girls with more opportunities to enrol at college. However, the effect
of family investment has been increased more for women than for men. This indi-
cates that expansion policy is beneficial for the students with more highly schooled
parents and women depends more on that.
4.5.3.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimation
According to Equation 4.8, the following tables reports the estimated coefficients of
interaction between parents’ schooling years separately and ∆supply. The depen-
dent variable is an indicator for whether the individual attends college. We are also
interested in the difference in policy effect in terms of gender. Previous studies sug-
gest that the higher education policy produces different educational opportunities
for male and female students. If the main interaction coefficients are positive, it
indicates that education policy benefits more on the families with highly schooled
background.
In detail, Table 4.17 reports the effects of creation of new college sites in different
provinces. The effect remains robust to the inclusion of regional controls, and it is
positively related to high schooling families. It indicates that the estimates show a
positive effect of creation of new colleges on the probability of entering college for
children endowed with highly educated parents. The coefficients of the interaction
between parents’ schooling years and policy*∆supply are our main interests. The
coefficients 0.082 with father’s schooling years and 0.074 with mother’s schooling
years demonstrate that family background effect increased 8.2 percent and 7.4 per-
cent respectively when one new college per 10000 individuals aged 19 was created.
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Table 4.18 and Table 4.19 show female students have more effects on family
background from education expansion than males do. When higher education ex-
panded, females from urban and advanced families obtain more opportunities to
access to college. Therefore, females can get greater benefit from the education pol-
icy. However, the rural families are more likely to be difficult to afford the tuition
fee and living expanse at the college. Probably the reason is that the tuition fee is
increasing year by year. As a result, the higher education expansion leads to more
persistent intergenerational immobility. Policy-makers in China should therefore be
more cautious and do more research with the further education expansion.
The results from difference-in-difference model are consistent with the results
from the “before” and “after” model. It is obvious higher education expansion has
narrowed the gender gap in college access and women have more opportunities to
enter college. However, the opportunities of higher expansion still depends on family
background and it is beneficial for the students with more highly schooled parents.
The equality of higher education opportunities remains a difficult task. One of
the explanations is the increasing tuition fees. The tuition system was unified in
1997, and tuition and fees vary by institutions, locations and programs. Reliance on
household wealth to finance students’ tertiary education, the lack of well–established
credit markets, and substantial increases in tuition and fees might restrict the oppor-
tunities for students from poor families to attain a college education. Thus China’s
geographic unbalance and segregation could potentially affect enrolment decisions
through financial constraints faced by different residential groups.
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4.5.4 Robustness Checks
4.5.4.1 Alternative Specifications–Placebo Test
In order to ascertain whether the increase in higher education opportunities is due to
expansion reform, we conduct a placebo study. In view of some uncertainty regrading
the treatment cohorts, we carry out the checks using alternatively birth-year cutoffs.
Equation 4.8 are estimated in a “policy off” period as a placebo test. We consider
a potential controlled experiment by comparing the child-parent correlation of two
older cohorts. For example, we compares those born 1971 to 1975 and those born
1976 to 1980. That is, we use different control and treatment groups where the
control group is defined as those born between 1971 and 1975 and the treatment
group is defined as those born between 1976 and 1980. The impact of the policy
should be quite small or insignificant.
Table 4.20: Robustness Check—Placebo Test
Effect of expansion With father’s education
Father’s education 0.020***
(0.003)
(edpit ∗ policyi ∗∆supplyp) -0.0065
(0.044)
R-squared 0.1295
With mother’s education
Mother’s education 0.023***
(0.001)
(edpit ∗ policyi ∗∆supplyp) 0.0068
(0.040)
R-squared 0.1342
Regional control variables
∆High school graduates (1998-2005) No
∆Average income (1998-2005) No
No. of observations 6107
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4.5.4.2 Alternative Specifications–Effects of the Number of Colleges
There is another test for the effects of the number of local colleges on intergenera-
tional educational mobility. We changed ∆supply to supply. In this section, we use
the alternative method to estimate the effect of opening the new colleges on inter-
generational educational mobility. Before reform, universities and colleges tended
to be concentrated in the large cities, while after reform, they expanded into smaller
cities. The specification interacted between family background and the changes in
intensity, which supports the suggestion made in the previous section that family
background is a powerful predictor of an individual’s educational outcomes.
This section continues to explore the intergenerational educational mobility for
the interaction between higher education supply at the provincial level and parents’
schooling years, which is the differential effect of higher education supply by family
background captured by the coefficient α3. First, we use the new supply, which is
the number of colleges for each cohort to replace the changes of supply ∆supply.
We also consider the following relationship between the education of an individual
i, born in p, in year t, and the exposure to the reform. For new supply in terms of
the number of colleges (uniit) by year, the equation is as follows.
edcit = α0 + α1ed
p
it + α2Zi + α3(ed
p
it ∗ uniit) + uniit + α5(Regionvar)
+βprovince + γcohort + εit (4.9)
where edcit indicates the children’s educational outcome of attending college. ed
p
it
is the schooling years of their parents. uniit denotes the number of colleges and
universities in their province instead of the changes of supply. βprovince is the region
of residence fixed effect and γcohort is the birth cohort fixed effect. The intensity of
supply is the number of colleges by region divided by inhabitants aged 19 who are
the potential college students. From Table 4.21, we observe that the supply increases
the percentage of children with access to college. Moreover, the interaction between
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university supply and family background is positive, a result similar to that presented
in the previous section. With the increasing number of colleges, parental educational
background still has a strong impact on children’s higher education opportunities.
This indicates that the expansion policy is beneficial for the students with more
highly schooled parents.
From Table 4.21, it is obvious that the policy is beneficial for the highly edu-
cated families with more highly schooled parents. The positive correlation between
parents’ education level and the number of colleges in their province causes a more
persistent intergenerational immobility. This is another robustness check for the
methodology of the natural experiment approach.
Table 4.21: Robustness Check—Effects of the Number of Colleges
Effect of expansion With father’s education
Father’s education 0.0082*** 0.0086*** 0.0080***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
edfit ∗ uniit 0.1200*** 0.1166*** 0.1151***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
R-squared 0.1642 0.1651 0.1655
With mother’s education
Mother’s education 0.0125*** 0.0130*** 0.0132***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
edmit ∗ uniit 0.1056*** 0.1011*** 0.0995***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
R-squared 0.1727 0.1734 0.1736
Regional control variables
High school graduates (1998-2005) No No Yes
Average income (1998-2005) No Yes Yes
No. of observations 10613 10613 10613
Note: Estimated using CFPS 2010. Robust standard errors in brackets with
clustering by year of birth. Also with province fixed effects and cohort fixed
effects.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines the role of the higher education expansion policy in increasing
the equality of higher education opportunities. The goal is to explore the impact of
family background and gender on access to higher education, prior to and following
the higher education expansion policy. Cohort-level analysis and a difference-in-
difference model are used to estimate how the benefits of the higher education ex-
pansion were distributed. The results show that higher education expansion has not
been equally distributed among people from richer and poorer backgrounds. The
education of parents remains a strong determinant of educational outcomes among
children following education reform. Despite the benefits brought on by the ex-
pansion system, such as more opportunities for accessing tertiary education, these
benefits have not been distributed evenly among families, geographies or gender.
The equality of higher education opportunities remains a difficult task.
In terms of intergenerational educational mobility, children’s educational out-
comes are strongly correlated to parents’ level of education. The intergenerational
educational coefficient of the mothers is larger than that of the fathers. Both of
the intergenerational educational coefficients increased over the cohorts implying
that intergenerational educational mobility declined for the young generations of
children. Moreover, the opportunities of attending a college for the children grew
significantly due to education reform in China. The association between parents’
and children’s education remains and is even larger after the higher education expan-
sion, especially in the case of parents with higher educational level. Also, parental
educational background tends to have more impact on women’s educational attain-
ment. The results imply that education policy should target children from the low
parental educational background as well as women in the future.
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Appendix
4.A Regional Variation
Figure 4.8: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (1)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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Figure 4.9: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (2)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
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Figure 4.10: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (3)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
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Figure 4.11: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (4)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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4.B Intergenerational Educational Mobility
Figure 4.12: Countries Ranked by Average Parent-Child Schooling Correlation
Data Source: Hertz et al. (2008).
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Figure 4.13: Intergenerational Educational Regression Coefficients by Birth Cohort
Data Source: Hertz et al. (2008).
Figure 4.14: Intergenerational Educational Regression Correlations by Birth Cohort
Data Source: Hertz et al. (2008).
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Chapter 5
Returns to Higher Education and
the Effects of Higher Education
Policy on the Labour Market
5.1 Introduction
Education plays an essential role in determining labour market outcomes, with more
highly educated individuals generally achieving higher incomes (Psacharopoulos,
1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). The educational levels of populations
may explain the trajectory of economic development in several countries (Griliches,
1970; Becker, 1975). In a seminal contribution to understanding the relationship be-
tween education and earnings, Mincer (1974) introduces a human capital framework
focused on the determination of education and earnings, spawning a large scope of
literature reviews in which the natural logarithm of people’s earnings—measured
as hourly, monthly, or annual wages—serves as an additive function of education,
which is in years of schooling or attainment of a high school diploma or college
degree, work experience, and other factors. Additional subsequent studies have ex-
amined the extent to which the correlation between education level and earnings is
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causal (Card, 1999).
China is significant as an example country for examining the correlation be-
tween education level and earnings. In the early 1980s, the Chinese economic system
changed from being a socialist planned economy to a market-oriented economy (Lin,
2013). One particular reason that has been put forward for the country’s rapid eco-
nomic development is a relatively highly-educated labour force, compared to those
of other developing countries. Moreover, an increasing number of higher education
students have graduated from colleges in China in recent years. The expansion of
higher education has seen tertiary education attract large numbers of college stu-
dents. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether expanding higher education
has economic benefits for those who attended college following this higher education
development.
The role of higher education has been widely studied in developed and develop-
ing countries recently. In modern societies, completing higher education may enable
prospective careers for individuals and lead to increased earnings. Consequently,
higher education is generally recognised as fundamental to human development and
economic growth. In the past number of decades, the significant expansion of higher
education has taken place both in China and around the world (Altbach et al., 2010).
China, as a developing and transitional country, has experienced higher education
expansion reform, with the number of new college students rising from 1.08 million
in 1998 to 6.62 million in 2010. Many economists and policy makers (Ashenfelter
and Rouse, 1999; Downey, 2008) believe this type of expansion raises the skill lev-
els of individuals and labour market outcomes, thereby improving economic gains.
However, expansion has given rise to debate about the negative effects of educa-
tion policy on the labour market, due to the increasing supply of higher education
graduates (Knight et al., 2016).
The question of whether an increase in schooling years causes an increase in
income level is a basic concern of development economists. A large scope of literature
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exists on returns to education in developing countries; however, very little effort has
been made to treat education expansion as exogenous. While compulsory education,
including primary school and junior middle school, is accepted as a basic right
in both developed and developing countries, the majority of developing countries
still consider college education as a result of private investment in education on
the part of students’ families (Zhong, 2011). The estimates of private returns to
higher education can inform decisions regarding individual human capital investment
and the efficient allocation of resources. Moreover, most developing countries have
experienced rapid higher education expansion during the past 30 years. The concern
has been raised that this expansion may produce many over-educated populations
that surpass the demands of society and the labour market (Schofer and Meyer,
2005). A comparison of the returns to higher education can provide useful knowledge
for policy makers regarding the appropriate allocation of higher education resources,
and the effectiveness of education expansion on the labour market.
Research focusing on returns to higher education is particularly significant for
China, as the country has witnessed unprecedented higher education expansion dur-
ing the past 30 years. The increasing supply of higher education graduates has
has a profound impact on China’s economic and labour market structures. An at-
tentive examination of returns to higher education can inform further educational
and economic policies. However, to date, there has been little research that explic-
itly discusses the returns with higher education expansion. This study examines
the causal impact of higher education expansion on labour market outcomes for
young college graduates, and identifies the distribution of the returns on investment
in education through the implementation of a natural experiment. As such, this
chapter gained access to the newly available Urban Household Survey conducted by
the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) in order to compare the extent of
returns to college education among the pre-expansion cohort of students, and the
post-expansion cohort. Furthermore, a variety of approaches are used to identify
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the impact of education expansion in 1999 on Chinese labour market outcomes.
The first question that will be addressed in this chapter concerns how returns
to education have evolved, particularly in tertiary education, over the past three
decades. CHIP-2013 data updating empirical estimates of the returns to education
is the most recent data on the subject, and served as a primary source of data in this
study. CHIP-1995, 2002, and 2007 data were also used to compare cohort results.
The second aim of this chapter is to compare the returns by using hourly wages for
recent graduates, both before and after the education expansion policy; following
on, a difference-in-difference model will be applied to identify the effect on returns
for students who had a college degree or a high school diploma, either before or after
the expansion.
The final aim of this chapter is to consider whether the increased supply of higher
education graduates has changed labour market outcomes, and how this sharp in-
crease in the supply of college graduates has affected the college wage premium for
affected cohorts. To answer this, the effects of educational expansion on the labour
market is identified by implementing a cohort-level analysis, as well as difference-
in-difference model. The cohort-level analysis identifies the effects of education ex-
pansion on returns, before and after expansion. Following on, regional variations in
the intensity of the education expansion is exploited to produce the aforementioned
natural experiment, using a difference-in-difference model. This will assist in solving
problems arising from the distribution of regions that are uncorrelated with differ-
ent macro trends by area. Differences among provinces between the dates of the
effective implementation of higher education expansion will be used to evaluate the
impact on the labour market. As discussed in Chapter 4, the primary methodology
is based on the work by Duflo (2002) and Bratti et al. (2008). This chapter of the
thesis is novel in that it explores the mechanisms behind expansion policy’s effects,
by analysing demographic and socioeconomic consequences for individuals. In par-
ticular, this study explores regional variation in numbers related to the expansion
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of colleges across provinces, and high school cohorts.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the relevant
literature on returns to education, the background of higher education expansion,
and the effects of education expansion on the labour market. Section 5.3 describes
the data used in this study and the descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 is the model of
the Mincer equation and the curve of demand and supply function. Section 5.5 and
Section 5.6 contain the empirical specifications and results, including the robustness
checks. Finally, Section 5.7 draws conclusions from the results.
5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1 Returns to Education
There are many theories to explore the returns to education. Human capital theory
is one of the most used theories. Mincer (1974) found that the distribution of
labour incomes is a function of schooling and experience. He developed the human
capital earnings function. The equation has been examined by using many datasets
worldwide. The logarithm of earnings is modelled as the sum of years of schooling
and a quadratic function of years of experience.
The relationship between schooling and earnings can be analysed from the per-
spective, namely the motivation behind the initial decision to undertake investment
in education. In the analysis of this investment decision, Mincer (1974) highlighted
the trade-off that deferred earnings present to an individual, noting that investment
in education will only occur if deferred income increases. Similarly, Becker et al.
(1964) notes that the amount of funds allocated to human capital investment is
influenced by the profitability of the investment, or its rate of return. Behrman
et al. (1996) views sufficiently large earnings upon graduation as compensation for
the costs of undertaking study. They point out that education is able to affect
productivity, and schooling can be helpful at the commencement stage of work.
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There are several papers about returns to education in China. Johnson and
Chow (1997) and Liu (1998) used the data from the 1988 Chinese Household In-
come Project (CHIP-88) to estimate a 3%-4% education return. Using a similar
specification, Sai (2003), using a sample of more than 9000 observations from 2002
reported an increasing trend of education return from 1988 to 2002. Most of the
estimated returns are considerably lower than the 10.1% world average and the
9.6% Asian average, as well as the 11.2% range for low and middle-income countries
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). In the previous studies, due to the data limi-
tations, the estimated results were based on monthly or annual wage rates. And the
monthly or annual wage rates clearly depended on the working hours. This omit-
ted working hour variables may bias the result. The rapid development in China
attracted increasingly attention, hence scholars investigated the education return in
recent years. Furthermore, labour force participation for women has shown a high
participation rate in the labour market in China, especially among younger cohorts.
Therefore, it is worth comparing the returns to education by gender.
In China, most existing studies found low returns to education. The transition in
higher education coincided with economic transition. The scale of higher education
in terms of newly accepted college students and graduates kept increasing after
the beginning of an open reform policy. Most literature on returns to education
in China, based on data from the 1990s and early 2000s, found that the rate of
return to education has experienced a rapid increase due to economic development.
Some studies indicate that higher education expansion started in 1999 and made an
unbalanced demand and supply in the labour market leading to unemployment and
low-quality jobs for college graduates. Yiming (2009) used the data of China Health
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) and analysed the change in return to education to
explore the impact of high education. This study investigates whether the returns
to education are still increasing in the later 2000s and how the returns to education
have changed due to the higher education expansion in recent years.
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5.2.2 Education Expansion and Labour Markets
The consequences of higher education expansion on the labour market were first
examined in Freeman (1976). In the United States, tertiary education expanded
rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s. However, employment conditions for students
with college degrees worsened sharply. The ratio of graduate starting salaries to
average salaries declined over the same period, while the unemployment rate among
recent college graduates rose substantially. Card and Lemieux (2001) investigated
the college premium in the UK, Canada, and the US, and found that the increases
in the premium between 1980 and 1995 had been driven by drops in the growth
of educational attainment, which began with cohorts born in the 1950s. Knight
and Sabot (1990) analysed the effects of secondary school expansion in the labour
market in East Africa, and found that the wage structure in the market sector had
been compressed by education expansion.
Devereux and Fan (2011) used cohort-level variation as an instrument for es-
tablishing post-secondary enrolment in the UK in the 1990s, for cohorts who were
born between 1970 and 1975. This method employs a different approach, i.e. IV,
and impacts on returns to education. The researchers observed significant earnings
profits for the post-expansion cohorts. This result suggests that those students who
experienced education expansion earned significantly more as a result of the post-
secondary education expansion. Gurgand and Maurin (2007) examined the effect of
education expansion in France by comparing the earnings of different birth cohorts,
and also found benefits among compliers for the post-expansion cohorts. In contrast,
Walker and Zhu (2008) analysed higher education expansion in the UK during the
period 1994 to 2006, comparing the returns to education among pre-expansion and
post-expansion individuals. Their results suggest no changes in the returns to higher
education for males, and a significant increase in returns for females.
A small number of studies has focused on the recent labour market and returns
for college graduates in China, but few have examined the returns to education
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alongside the impact of the education in detail. Shi and Xing (2010) used the 1%
Chinese Population Survey of 2005 to investigate how education expansion affected
access for different types of people. Chi et al. (2012) analysed the Chinese Urban
Household Survey for the period 1989 to 2009, examining the starting earnings and
jobs of different entrance-year cohorts, and the subsequent growth in earnings over
the next few years. Chi et al. (2012) found that the wages and employment of
young workers varied according to market conditions at the time of labour market
entry. Both Wu and Zhang (2010) and Li et al. (2014) identified the negative
impacts of education reform on the labour market. These papers compare summary
statistics between younger cohorts who experienced the expansion policy and older
cohorts who did not. Most recently, Ou and Zhao (2016) examined the causal
impact of education policy on labour market outcomes for young college students.
They used the difference-in-difference method and found that expansion decreased
unemployment rates, particularly among men. There is also some proof that higher
education policy has narrowed the gender gap in terms of college access (Wu and
Zhang, 2010).
5.2.3 Institutional Background
Education in China is a state-run system of public education. The policy on com-
pulsory education, which took effect in 1986, requires all children to attend school
for at least nine years. This compulsory education consists of six years’ primary
school and three years’ junior middle school. Following this period of compulsory
education, three years of senior middle school can be considered as a transition to
college or university. Alternatively, students can choose to enter vocational or tech-
nical schools, which generally require three years to complete. While students from
senior middle schools are provided the prospect of higher education, they also face
strong competition for college admission.
In the past, only a small proportion of senior middle school students who per-
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formed well in the national college entrance exam were accepted into colleges and
universities. However, this fraction has expanded considerably in the past several
years. Undergraduate education can be divided into two basic categories: three-year
college programmes earning a diploma, and four-year university programmes earn-
ing a degree. In addition to undergraduate education, postgraduate education is
expanding rapidly in the Chinese education system. Currently, roughly 30% to 40%
of young adults of college-age in China are enrolled in colleges and universities. This
enrolment rate is comparable to that of many developed countries, and it indicates
that China has attained significant achievement in expanding its higher education
programmes.
China has the largest number of higher education students in the world. Ac-
cording to the Ministry of Education, there were 2,560 public higher education
institutions enrolling 26.2 million students in 2015, including 1,219 regular higher
education institutions with a total enrolment of 15.7 million, and 1,341 specialised
colleges with a total enrolment of 10.4 million. With a centralised educational sys-
tem, all the higher education institutions are under the control of the Ministry of
Education through enrolment planning, administration, and funding.
Since 1977, all students from high school need to take the National College
Entrance Examination (NCEE) to gain entrance into HE institutions at undergrad-
uate level. The initial gross college enrolment rate was extremely low, at only about
1.55% in 1978. Since the economic opening up policy in 1978, China’s economy has
been growing at a rapid rate, together with significant demand for high-skill workers
and higher education graduates. Up to the early 1990s, the admission rate to col-
lege education maintained a relatively constant growth. However, during the Asian
financial crisis in 1998, in order to drive economic growth, alleviate unemployment,
stimulate domestic consumption, and meet the tremendous demand for higher edu-
cation, the State Council decided to embark on a radical enrolment expansion plan
which was proposed by the Ministry of Education.
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After December 1998, the government only took several months for the policy to
be announced and to be put into effect. Since the implementation of the expansion
plan in September 1999, the rate of new students entering tertiary education and the
number of college graduates has kept rising dramatically (Li et al., 2014). The college
admission rate has increased by more than 30%, from 43% in 1998 to 60% in 1999.
The admission rate has been kept at about 70% since then. Simultaneously, the
actual gross enrolment rate increased from less than 10% in 1998 to over 20% in 2005.
After 2005, the government started to control the rapid growth of higher education
enrolment, and the growth of the college admission rate transformed to a relatively
steady and moderate trend. Given the unprecedented scale of the expansion, many
researchers term this radical policy a great leap forward in higher education (Shi
and Xing, 2010). Knowing the socioeconomic context and structural changes of
China’s higher education helps to understand how the reform affects class, genders,
and region inequalities in labour market outcomes. Thus in recent years, scholars
have paid more attention to the relation between high education expansion and the
labour market. Those studies focused on higher education and the employment rate,
higher education expansion and income distribution, and returns to education.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 CHIP Datasets
Data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) in 1995, 2002, 2007, and
2013 was used to estimate returns to education and the labour market consequences
of a supply shock. The data was gathered by the Institute of Economics, and the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with assistance from the Asian Development
Bank and the Ford Foundation. CHIP data has several advantages over other Chi-
nese data sources in that the samples were chosen from significantly larger samples
drawn by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). They contain detailed
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information about the numerous sources of education attainment (highest education
level of every family member, years of schooling, school type) and income informa-
tion (average annual income, working days per month, working hours per day).
CHIP is well known for the high quality and national representativeness of its data,
and has been used in many studies on the determinants of incomes (Zhong, 2011).
To track the dynamics of income distribution in China, the data was gathered in
five waves of household surveys in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013. CHIP-2013 is
mainly used in this paper to estimate the most recent returns to education.
The specific advantages of using CHIP data are as follows. First, CHIP con-
tains detailed socioeconomic information on households, their members and their
communities, for example, annual earnings, wages for the past five years including
subsidies, working hours per day, working days per month, unemployment, and job
type. Second, the CHIP includes two measures of education: years of schooling
and highest level of education. The data contains a direct question on the years of
education completed by the end of the survey year. Using additional questions on
highest level of education, we can construct a series of dummy variables for the fol-
lowing five educational categories: primary school and below, junior middle school,
senior middle school including vocational or technical school, three-year college, and
four-year university. The survey also contains good information on the length of
degree courses, relative performance at school, and marks in the National College
Entrance Examination (2007 and 2013). Third, the data is nationally representative
and contains rich information during the period of the labour supply shock. It is
possible to examine the effect of higher education expansion on the labour market.
CHIP consists of three parts: the Urban Household Survey, the Rural Household
Survey, and the Migrant Household Survey. This study only includes individuals
from the Urban Household Survey and excludes rural-urban migrants and rural
households. The reasons for this are first, the majority of higher education graduates
are employed in urban areas. All higher education graduates born in rural areas are
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entitled to obtain an urban huhou residence registration. Second, other urban-rural
migrants from the Migrant Household Survey are generally not eligible to have an
urban registration and so do not have the same opportunities to work in urban areas.
Third, the institutional differences in the labour markets for the three groups imply
that separate analyses would be more reliable (Knight and Song, 2005). As the
urban labour market for higher education graduates is by far the most important of
the three, the analysis is confined to the urban sample. Higher education graduates
account for 16.9% of employees in the 2002 urban sample, 0.6% in the rural-urban
migrant sample, and 0.4% in the rural sample.
The urban subsamples cover 11 out of 31 provinces in 1995, and 15 provinces in
2002, 2007, and 2013. In 1995, 31,827 individuals were included in the urban sample,
compared to 21,698 in 2002, 20,439 in 2007 and 24,376 in 2013. As one-third of all
households are dropped by the NBS each year, the surveys do not contain any of the
same households. The surveys are representative subsamples of the NBS national
household samples.
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Data
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics of urban residents aged 23 to 60 in 1995,
2002, 2007, and 2013 and presents the variable means of the included variables
in the four cross-sections. Workers in 2007 and 2013 were better educated and
more experienced than those in the previous two samples: 11.8 years of schooling
were completed on average in the 2013 sample, compared with an average of 8.9
years in 1995. Also, more than 30% of students attended tertiary education in
2007 and 2013, which is much higher than those in 1995 (16%) and 2002 (20%).
Estimated time in the labour force is five years greater for urban residents with the
average 2007 (26.2) and 2013 (24.4) compared with the average between 1995 and
2002 (20.85). As well as the earnings and education levels, the statistics include
other independent variables, which are communist, ethnicity and state sector. The
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independent variable “Communists” is dummy variable, which is equal to one if
individuals are communist party members. “Ethnicity” is equal to one if people are
national minority. “State” is equal to one if individuals work in a state sector.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable 1995 2002 2007 2013
Log earnings (Yuan) 8.9 9.0 9.9 10.5
Years of Schooling 9.9 10.6 11.6 11.8
Educational Attainment Level:
Below Elementary School 8.6 5.9 2.8 1.2
Elementary School 15.1 12.5 6.9 6.4
Junior Middle School 28.1 21.1 24.7 29.1
Upper Middle School 32.5 33.2 34.5 30.6
3-Year College 10.0 14.3 17.9 16.8
4-Year University and above 6.0 7.0 13.1 15.9
Sex (% male) 49.6 49.2 49.5 49.9
Communists(%party members) 21.2 18.4 21.2 18.9
Ethnicity(%minority) 4.5 4.4 1.3 4.9
Sector(%state employment) 85.7 51.0 42.1 28.4
Experience 21.6 20.1 26.2 24.4
Age(Years) 38.1 39.5 41.0 41.7
Figure 5.1: Hourly Wages by Age Group and Survey Year
Figure 5.1 shows that individuals have highest salaries when they are at the age
of 30s (see Figure 5.8 and 5.9 in the appendix). Average hourly wages in 2007 and
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2013 are much higher than those in 1995 and 2002. With the development of the
Chinese economy, the hourly wages have been significantly improved.
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics of HE Reform
China’s higher education expansion policy has effectively increased tertiary educa-
tion rates in the 21st century, driving up the gross enrolment rate from 9.8% in 1998
to 32% in 2010. The standard university first degree in China entails a four-year
course and the standard college degree entails a three-year course, both starting in
the autumn of each year. While some research (Machin and McNally, 2007) has
shown that increasing the share of highly educated individuals can lead to improved
employment rates and higher salaries among the newly educated, some other exist-
ing studies (Wu and Zhao, 2010) on the effects of higher education expansion have
identified negative impacts on labour market outcomes for college graduates.
Figure 5.2: General College Student Enrolment
As well as the main datasets of CHIP, as in the previous chapter, the Chinese
Education Year Book has been used to provide information about the inflow and
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outflow of college students. Figure 5.2 illustrates that, from 1999, the number of new
college students increased dramatically, and consequently around 2002 and 2003, the
number of college graduates began to surge as well, as there are 3-year colleges and
4-year universities in China. Therefore, the supply of higher education graduates in
the labour market began to increase from 2002.
Figure 5.3: Average Income and Non-employment Rate in Urban areas
Figure 5.8 displays the average income and non-employment rate by year in
urban areas. The average income increased continuously between 1990 and 2010.
One reason for this is that the Chinese economy grew rapidly over the years 1988-
1998 (by 9.6% per annum) and over the years 1998-2008 (by 9.8% per annum).
However at the same time, there was a jump in the non-employment rate from
2001, which was probably due to increased labour supply. In the next section, we
compare the labour force participation rate, unemployment rate, and wages before
and after HE expansion.
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5.4 Model
5.4.1 Mincerian Equation
Earning functions are one of the most important empirical questions in labor eco-
nomics and economics of education as economists try to disentangle the return for
going to college. The most commonly used labour earnings model in the literature
is a Mincer-type human capital model (Mincer, 1974).
h(s, x) = h(.)e(β1S + β2X + β3X
2) (5.1)
which follows the Mincerian human capital structure, where h(.) is a function of an
individual’s characteristics regardless of the yeas of education and work experience.
Individuals’ characteristics are age, gender and so on. S is years of schooling. X is
years of experience.
Mincer’s Accounting identity model is summarised as follows (Mincer, 1974).
The empirical regression can adapt the standard Mincerian equation from the ac-
counting identify model.
Pt = Pt−1(1 + kt−1ρt − 1)
=
t−1∏
j=0
(1 + ρjkj)P0
lnPt = lnP0 + sln(1 + δ1) +
t−1∑
j=s
ln(1 + ρlkj)
≈ lnP0 + Sδ1 + ρl
t−1∑
j=s
kj (5.2)
where Pt represents the potential earnings at age t, with s years of education, and
k the ratio of costs of training investment. ρt is the average return to training
investment at time t.
Given a constant rate of return to schooling δ1 for j=1...s, and a constant rate of
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return to training investment ρl. By assuming a linearly declining rate of post-school
investment: ks+x = k(1− xT ) where x = T − s with T is the amount of the length of
experience after schooling, then
lnY (s, x) ≈ lnPx+s − k(1− x
T
) =
[lnP0 − k] + sδ1 + ρl
t−1∑
j=s
kj +
kx
T
⇒
lnY (s, x) = [lnP0 − k] + sδ1 + (ρlk + ρlk
2T
+
k
T
)x− ρlk
2T
x2
= α0 + δ1s+ β0x+ β1x
2 (5.3)
By expressing the terms that do not change along with s and x, i.e., lnP0 − k
with the human capital function, we can derive a common structure of Mincerian
wage equation as follows:
lnY = β0 + β1education+ β2experience+ β3experience
2 + β4gender + β5age+ 
(5.4)
In the next section, the study follows the wage determining structure established
by Mincer and adds the following variables, e.g., communist party member, eth-
nicity, state sector and so on. The updated results on returns to education may
contribute to the existing knowledge in the field of wage determination, especially
for individuals with college degrees.
5.4.2 The Increasing Supply of HE Graduates
Obviously HE expansion increases the supply of tertiary education graduates; how-
ever, the labour market consequences of HE depend on the demand for graduates
as well as the supply of graduates. Following the simple supply-demand framework
(Machin and McNally, 2007), we start from the point where the demand and supply
are perfectly equalised.
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Figure 5.4: The Effect of Supply Increase in a Competitive Market
Figure 5.5: Incorporating Relative Demand Increase
In a perfectly competitive labour market, there is a reduction in the wage of
higher education graduation relative to the wages of less well educated workers.
With an increased supply of college graduates, which provides employers with a
wider choice of similarly qualified graduates, the market needs some time to adjust to
the expansion of higher education. Increases in labour market supply and expansion
in higher education together shift the supply curve to the right; however, the labour
demand does not change at the beginning and so the shift in the supply curve will
reduce the labour wage rate for a short period. One consequence of this shift is the
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decrease in the return to education.
Figure 5.4 shows a labour market with two types of labour: tertiary gradu-
ates (G) and non-graduates (N). The wages of graduates and non-graduates are
denoted by WG and WN , and their employment rates are respectively LG and LN .
In the usual economic model, we can see the initial equilibrium at the intersection
of the initial demand (D0) and supply curve (S0). At that time, the relative wages
are (WG/WN)0 while the relative employment is (LG/LN)0. If there is a dramatic
increase in HE supply, the supply curve shifts to the right (S1). Therefore, the
supply shock reduces the relative wage of tertiary graduates (from (WG/WN)0 to
(WG/WN)1).
However, if demand for HE graduates is also rising, the relative wages may need
to change again. Figure 5.5 shows that the wage premium can increase if demand
is increasing faster than supply. In a longer period, employers demand more HE
graduates and so the demand curve shifts to the right as well (from D0 to D1).
Although the number of graduates is rising, graduate-level jobs are increasing at a
faster rate and so are commensurate with higher relative wages.
The supply-demand framework has been widely used in the academic area of
developed countries (Katz and Murphy, 1992; David et al., 2005). Larger increases
in the demand for graduates are the only way to rationalise constant or increase
wage premiums in the face of the HE expansion. Much work has been done to
understand what lies behind the increase in demand in the US and the UK (Card
and Lemieux, 2001; Katz and Murphy, 1992). In both countries, wage premiums
have risen despite a massive education expansion in the supply of graduates with
a tertiary education. The supply and demand framework has also been applied to
other countries, Gebel and Pfeiffer (2010) for Germany, Jeong et al. (2005) for South
Korean and Li et al. (2012) for China.
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5.5 Empirical Specifications
5.5.1 OLS Estimation
A simple earnings function involves an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on
the natural logarithm of hourly wages as the dependent variable, with years of
schooling, labour market experience and its square as independent variables. We
choose to analyse hourly wages rather than annual wages because, as shown by pre-
vious studies (Li, 2003), educational levels are negatively correlated with working
hours in China. More formally educated people tend to work fewer hours on aver-
age, and the returns to education based on annual wages may be underestimated,
compared to productivity effects. This earnings function takes a log-linear form,
whereby the coefficient on years of schooling can be interpreted approximately as
the average rate of return to an additional year of education. Following Mincer, the
conventional model for estimating the returns to education is expressed as:
LnYi = β0 + β1Si + β2Ei + β3E
2
i + ui (5.5)
where LnYi is the natural log of the hourly wages of an individual i, Si repre-
sents years of schooling as a continuous variable, Ei is years of potential working
experience with a polynomial allowing for diminishing returns to wages beyond the
optimal experience level, and ui is the error term (Maurer-Fazio, 1999). Wages
are determined by investment in human capital, according to human capital theory.
Schooling is the main type of investment. β1 represents the return of an individ-
ual from the school education. It measures the percentage change in wage for each
additional year of schooling.
The labour market outcomes can also be several variables: (a) the individual’s
labour force participation rate, (b) the individual’s probability of being unemployed,
(c) the individual’s probability of being in a state job (d) the log of the hourly wage
(e) the log of the annual wage for individuals.
138
To avoid confounding effects on the dependent variable, controls for gender
(male=1), sector of employment (State sector=1), minority groups (non-Han=1)
and Communists (party members=1) augment the baseline model to the following
equation:
LnYi = β0 + β1Si + β2Ei + β3E
2
i + β
′
4Zi + ui = β0 + β1Si + β2Ei
+β3E
2
i + β4male+ β5state+ β6party + β7minority + ui (5.6)
Regarding political capital, in the form of Communist Party membership, it is
assumed not to increase job productivity and is expected to decline in importance
relative to human capital over the course of transition. Moreover, given that the new
employment opportunities may arise in a non-state sector that is most responsive
to market forces, the non-state sector may be able to attract and better reward the
brightest job candidates.
In order to focus specifically, the above equation can be modified to estimate
the returns to education at different levels. The above specifications treat years of
education as a continuous variable which ignores specificities associated with edu-
cational credentials (Mincer, 1974; Psacharopoulos, 1994). Adjusting the model to
distinguish between different levels of education requires a series of dummy vari-
ables to represent specific educational attainment. Since the majority of urban
residents have completed a minimum of primary school education, as a result of the
introduction of universal compulsory education (Qian and Smyth, 2008), the use
of completed elementary schooling allows for meaningful comparisons to be made.
We can construct a series of other dummy variables for the following educational
categories: elementary school and below, junior middle school, upper middle school
and vocational or technical school, three-year college, and four-year university.
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A further model modification is as follows:
LnYi = β0 + β1
i=5∑
i=1
education+ β2Ei + β3E
2
i + β4male+ β5age+ β6state
+β7party + β8minority + ui (5.7)
5.5.2 Cohort-based Analysis
The previous section sets out to update the empirical estimates of the returns to
higher education in China with access to a recent urban household survey for 2013,
and directly compare the returns to education of young cohorts across time. How-
ever, the extent of returns among the pre-expansion cohort and the post-expansion
cohort remains unclear. Greater precision on the effects of higher education is
needed. Therefore, this section provides indicative evidence on the labour market
consequences of the shock to supply of HE graduates. We use cohort-based analysis
across successive cohorts from large cross section datasets for the pooled data from
1990 to 2013, which covers the period when the higher education participation rate
increased dramatically.
The standard university first degree consists of a four-year course while the stan-
dard college degree comprises a three-year course, both starting in the autumn of
each year. The HE expansion started in 1999. Thus, even the freshest graduates
captured in the 2002 survey had enrolled prior to 1999, the year in which enrolment
began to expand rapidly. By contrast, the 2007 and 2013 survey contained some of
those who had graduated in the five years 2003-2007 and 2009-2013 after the educa-
tion expansion. It is possible to compare this cohort with the cohorts who graduated
before the higher education expansion. The methodology used in this section com-
pares the hourly earnings of a pre-expansion cohort with those of a post-expansion
cohort. Given that policy expansion is exogenous to individual decisions for college
enrolment and, therefore, can be considered as quasi-experiment (Card, 1999), a
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direct comparison between pre- and post-policy periods can give a more direct and
reliable effect estimate.
A small number of studies compare cohorts differentially exposed to the expan-
sion of higher education. Walker and Zhu (2008) analysed the expansion of higher
education in the UK during the period 1994-2006, comparing the returns to educa-
tion among pre-expansion and post-expansion cohorts. They find no changes in the
returns to higher education for men, and a significant rise in returns for women.
Using this cohort-level approach, we follow the methodology of Walker and Zhu
(2008) to quantify the effects of the higher education expansion on labour market
outcomes and identify the distribution of the returns to education. In our analysis,
we include observations of those who have a college degree together with those that
left school, usually at the age of 18, with at least the minimum qualifications of senior
middle school that are required for consideration for admission to higher education.
We drop observations of those under the age of 23, who had not had time to graduate
from college. We compute crude cohort-level analysis, for those that entered college
after the HE expansion compared to those cohorts that attended higher education
before the expansion.
LnYit = β0 + β1uniit + β2policyt + β3uniit ∗ policyt + β4uniit ∗Borni
+β5Xit + uit (5.8)
where LnYit is the natural log of the hourly wages of an individual i; uniit is
whether an individual has a college or university degree or not; policyt is a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 if an individual entered college after expansion (young
cohort). The variable is equal to 0 if people had higher education before the educa-
tion reform (old cohort). Borni is the birth year of individuals. β3 captures the
change in the college premium after the education expansion. β4 captures the time
trend because the variation is at birth year level. The regression clustered at year
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of birth.
To refine this analysis, we collapse the macro data into cells defined by birth
cohort and age. The disaggregated regression allows us to check the patterns un-
derlying the previous regression.
LnYit = β0 + β1uniit + β2
90∑
t=70
Cohorti + β3uniit ∗
t=90∑
t=70
Cohorti + β4Xit + uit (5.9)
where LnYit is the natural log of the hourly wages of an individual i at time t;
uniit is whether an individual has a college or university degree or not; Cohorti
is the birth year of individuals; Xit is a vector of individual characteristics. uit is
the error term. In these regressions, we observe that the college premium varies by
cohort groups through the inclusion of interaction.
5.5.3 Difference-in-Difference Approach
The difference-in-difference model explores the mechanisms behind the expansion
policy’s effects by examining individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic. In 1999,
Chinese colleges started to expand their supply by opening new sites and by offering
more enrolment in higher education. The “quasi-randomness” of higher education
expansion with respect to potential demand is key to our identifying strategy. Col-
leges pursued different strategies to expand supply. The provincial governments had
more control and ownership of the higher education institution. In fact, the supply
was not affected by factors influencing both supply and demand or by potential
demand.
The above approach used cohort-level analysis to describe the effects of higher
education expansion on labour market before and after the HE expansion. However,
the ability to identify the impact of the policy might be compromised if other factors
affect wages and returns for different cohorts. As in the previous chapter, we can
make use of a natural experiment from an unexpected increase in the number of
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colleges after 1999 which varies by province. We exploit variation in the intensity of
the expansion in the number of the colleges among provinces to evaluate individuals’
labour market outcomes and policy effects. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse
the labour market outcomes on having a college degree by province variation and
to assess whether the correlation has changed as a result of the expansion policy.
The evident province variation helps to solve the issue provided that distribution
of places is uncorrelated with different macro trends by areas. In this section, we
use the difference-in-difference model to analyse the causal effects of expansion on
specific regions. This helps explain the reasons for regional variations to quantify
the effects of education expansion on labour market outcomes.
This method is used to estimate the effects of the education policy. Expansion
is measured in terms of new colleges sites opened (see Figure 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 in the
appendix)1. We link individual educational attainment with region-level data from
China Educational Statistics Yearbook on the magnitude of the increase in regional
higher education expansion supply. While birth cohort determines treatment status,
treatment intensity is determined by the size of supply expansion by the region of
residence.
The main method used in this section is difference-in-difference (DID) estima-
tor. Our methodology mainly follows Duflo (2002)’s paper using the difference-in-
difference model to quantify the effects of primary school establishment on education
and labour market outcomes. Building upon their previous work, we also use dif-
ferences in exposure to the education reform and different intensities of expansion
based on number of colleges to estimate the following equation:
1The enrolment in higher education is another measure of the high education expansion. These
graphs show the positive correlation.
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LnYipt = α0 + α1uniipt + α2uniipt ∗ policyt ∗∆supply + α3(policyt ∗∆supplyp) + α4
(Regionvar ∗ policyt) + α5(Pre− supply ∗ cohort) + α6Xipt + βprovince + γcohort + εipt
(5.10)
where LnYipt is the natural log of the hourly wages of an individual i who was
born in province p at time t. supply denotes the number of colleges available
during the time when individuals’ entered to college. Xipt is a vector of individual
characteristics. ∆supplyp denotes the increase in the number of colleges available
during the education expansion period between 1998 and 2010. Pre-supply is the
number of colleges in 1998 which is just before the expansion. uniipt is whether
an individual has a college or university degree; βprovince is the region of residence
fixed effect and γcohort is the birth cohort fixed effect. The intensity of supply is the
number of colleges by region. Both Figure 5.6 and Table 5.2 show the changes of
number of colleges by provinces.
Figure 5.6: Changes of Number of Colleges by Provinces
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Table 5.2: Intensity of Higher Education Expansion by Province/Region
Region/Province 1998 2005 Changes 1998-2005
Beijing 63 77 14
Tianjin 20 42 22
Hebei 46 86 40
Shanxi 23 59 36
Liaoning 61 76 15
Jilin 41 44 3
Heilongjiang 38 62 24
Shanghai 40 58 18
Jiangsu 66 114 48
Zhejiang 32 68 36
Anhui 34 81 47
Fujian 29 53 24
Jiangxi 31 67 36
Shandong 49 59 50
Henan 51 83 32
Hubei 54 85 31
Hunan 47 93 46
Guangdong 22 35 13
Guangxi 28 51 23
Chongqing 22 35 13
Sichuan 43 68 25
Guizhou 20 34 14
Yunnan 26 44 18
Shannxi 42 72 30
Gansu 17 33 16
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5.6 Empirical Results
5.6.1 Changes in Returns to Education
The Mincer equation is used to estimate the returns to education for hourly-wage
rates. According to the previous discussion, annual earnings are related to working
hours, and working hours are correlated with schooling years. The estimation using
annual income may be biased if the working hours are not controlled. The educa-
tion effect may be underestimated using annual earnings. Therefore this dependent
variable of the regression is hourly wages. The primary independent variables are
schooling years or education levels and working experience. Moreover, the regres-
sion controls for community dummies, state sector dummies and minority dummies.
Based on the previous literature, gender is also added to control the wage deter-
mination in the regression. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the estimation results
from hourly wages. Two measures of education used in the regression are years of
schooling and education level dummies.
Table 5.3: Trend of Return to Education of Young Cohorts (23-35)
Variable 1995 2002 2007 2013
Schooling 0.0468*** 0.0924*** 0.0632*** 0.0858***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience 0.0734*** 0.0581*** 0.0442*** 0.0377***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Experience Squared -0.0013*** -0.0017*** -0.0004*** -0.0002***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Observation 3957 2821 2163 3177
Note: Estimated using CHIP 1995, 2002, 2007, 2013. Robust standard errors
are in brackets. The dependant variable is the log of hourly wage.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
Table 5.3 represents the returns to education based on a regression on years of
schooling. Students generally graduate from tertiary education at the age of 23.
146
The focus of this study is the labour market outcome of young graduates. As a
result, the observations are the groups between 23-years-old and 32-years-old in
each survey. The returns to education are 4.7%, 9.2%, 6.3% and 8.6% in the survey
years of 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013. The rapid increasing of returns was seen in 2002
as the economy developed and reformed in the mid 1990s. However, the returns to
education in 2007 and 2013 are lower than 2002. The higher education expansion
may contribute to the reduction in the returns to education. In the previous section,
Table 5.1 shows that the proportion of college and university graduates is above 30%
in the survey years 2007 and 2013, which increased by more than 10% in 2002. As
the college graduates increased rapidly after 1999, the market needs time to adjust
to the expansion of higher education expansion. The supply of the labour market
increases and the tertiary education policy shifts the supply curve to the right,
however, the demand for labour could have not changed straight away. Therefore,
the moving of the supply curve decreases the wage rate of the educated labour
force. These reasons contributed to the reduction of the returns to education after
the higher education expansion.
Table 5.4 also compares the results of current graduates during the past ten years
in each survey. It shows the trend of returns to higher education. The education
level dummy variables replaced the years of schooling in the model. The group
graduated from primary school and below is omitted as the base group. In 1995,
university graduates earned 61% more than the graduates from primary school and
below. In 2002, the level of returns to education increased dramatically due to
rapid economic development. Graduates with a degree earned 1.19 times more than
the individuals who graduated from below primary school and primary school. In
contrast, the rates of returns decreased in survey year 2007 and 2013. In the survey
years 2007 and 2013, there are several cohorts who entered college or university after
the higher education expansion policy. The supply of higher education graduates
rose significantly. Consequently, the returns to education are lower than the number
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Table 5.4: Trend of Return to Different Education Level of Younger Cohorts (23-35)
Variable 1995 2002 2007 2013
Four-year University 0.612*** 1.194*** 0.982*** 0.988***
(0.031) (0.043) (0.053) (0.045)
Three-year College 0.430*** 0.821*** 0.621*** 0.653***
(0.026) (0.039) (0.052) (0.043)
Upper Middle School 0.274*** 0.543*** 0.326*** 0.374***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.052) (0.039)
Lower Middle School 0.156*** 0.293*** 0.196*** 0.135***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.053) (0.039)
Experience 0.049*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience Squared -0.0006*** -0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0005***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Observation 3957 2821 2163 3177
Note: Estimated using CHIP 1995, 2002, 2007, 2013. Robust standard errors are
in brackets. The dependant variable is the log of hourly wage.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
in 2002. The coefficients for four-year university is 0.982 and 0.988 in 2007 and 2013
which are lower than the coefficient in 2002 (1.194). The coefficients for the three-
year college in 2007 and 2013 (0.621 and 0.653) are much lower than the coefficient
in 2002 (0.821). Using this comparison, we can observe the effect of the higher
education expansion for the changing of returns to education.
In summary, this section first updates the empirical estimates of the returns
to education with access to a most recent urban household survey for 2013. The
returns in 2007 and 2013 are lower than the returns of 2002. We can observe the
adverse effects on labour market outcomes from the education expansion. However,
this part only displays the comparative statistics during the separate survey years.
The next section pool available surveys to provide variation in cohort and time to
analyse the indicative effects of the education expansion reform.
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5.6.2 Cohort-based Analysis
The method we used is to compare the earnings of a pre-expansion cohort with
those of a post-expansion cohort. Given that a policy implementation is exogenous
to individual decisions for college entry and, therefore, can be considered as quasi-
experiment (Card, 1999), a direct comparison, between pre- and post-policy periods
can give a more direct and reliable effect estimate. Our focus is on how the college
premium has varied across time and across cohorts. The observations are the indi-
viduals who were 23 to 35 years in the survey year. If people have a college degree,
it means the variable “Uni” is equal to 1. If people have a senior middle school
diploma, the variable is equal to 0. Table 5.5 illustrates the HE expansion decreases
in individuals’ returns and labour market outcomes. According to Equation 5.8, β3
is negative which indicates the education expansion decreased the returns and the
labour market outcomes of college students.
Table 5.5: Cohort-level Analysis of Change in Returns
Total Male Female
Uni 0.3646*** 0.154*** 0.3879*
(0.0251) (0.0359) (0.0314)
Policy 0.0179* 0.0106 0.0548*
(0.0633) (0.0772) (0.0620)
Uni*Policy -0.0362* -0.0502* -0.0264**
(0.0448) (0.0532) (0.0542)
Observations 7952 3949 4003
R-squared 0.4853 0.5022 0.4668
Note: Estimated using polled data from CHIP 1995,
2002, 2007 and 2013. The sample focus on individuals
who were less than 35 in the survey year.
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
The positive coefficient of policy (1.79%) implies that individuals have the rela-
tively higher income after the higher education policy. The coefficient of individuals
with a college degree (36.46%) demonstrates people with a college degree have higher
salaries, compared the people with a senior middle school diploma. Moreover, the
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interaction between higher education policy and individuals with a degree is nega-
tive. The coefficient (-0.0362) indicates that education policy decreased the returns
of the persons with a college degree. For men, whose expansion effect is larger,
we find a 5.02% college premium prior to the expansion. We notice that female
wages increase by 5.48% after the education policy which is high than those of male.
Moreover, male with a degree decreases returns more than female. The negative
interactions of male and female are -0.050% and -0.026%. Therefore, the education
policy has more effects on the labour market for males.
According to Equation 5.11, we collapse the micro data into cells defined by birth
cohort. The disaggregated regression provides a check to the previous equation.
Table 5.6: Collapsed Data Estimates of Cohort-level Analysis
Total Male Female
Uni 0.3438*** 0.3218*** 0.3693***
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0288)
Born 1971-1975 -0.0093 0.0419 -0.0559*
(0.0288) (0.0379) (0.0335)
Born 1976-1980 0.0497* 0.0614* 0.0386*
(0.0503) (0.0703) (0.0542)
Born 1981-1985 0.0874* 0.1048* 0.0793*
(0.0598) (0.0833) (0.0620)
Born 1986-1990 -0.0310* -0.0322* -0.0231*
(0.0552) (0.0833) (0.0954)
Uni*Born 1971-1975 0.0433 0.0130* 0.0717*
(0.0388) (0.0406) (0.0512)
Uni* Born 1976-1980 0.0418* 0.0941* 0.0156*
(0.0452) (0.0618) (0.0409)
Uni*Born 1981-1985 0.0125* 0.0455* -0.0303*
(0.0536) (0.0542) (0.0584)
Uni* Born 1986-1990 -0.0556* -0.0960*** -0.0173**
(0.0554) (0.0613) (0.0939)
R-squared 0.5430 0.5616 0.6206
Note: Estimated using polled data from CHIP 1995, 2002, 2007
and 2013
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.6, which allows for the college
premium to vary by cohort groups. The base line is the individuals who were born
between 1965-1970. By comparing the pre-expansion cohort (born 1971-1980) with
the post-expansion cohort (born 1981-1990), we observe the similar results with the
previous table. To conclude, the higher education reform reduced returns and the
labour market outcomes of the graduates with a college degree.
5.6.3 Difference-in-Difference Estimation
Table 5.7 indicates an individual with a degree has higher hourly wages as the
coefficient of Uni is positive for the hourly salary. The coefficient of “policy ∗
∆supply” shows the effects of the numbers of colleges on salaries. Moreover, Uni ∗
policy∗∆supply is the interaction between degree, policy and intensity of the number
of colleges which is our interest. The coefficient of them is negative, no matter
whether we control for the regional variation or not.
The effect of higher education policy decreased the returns of the individuals
with a college degree, compared with the individuals holding a senior middle school
diploma. The returns decreases -2.218 when one new college per 10000 individuals
aged 19 was created in their province. The results reported in column (2) and
column (3) show the regression with regional control. The estimates illustrate a
significant negative effect of creation of new colleges on the returns and the labour
market with a college degree.
Table 5.8 reports the effects of higher education expansion on the returns and
the labour market by gender. The results illustrate expansion policy has negative
effect on individuals’ returns and labour market outcomes when they have a college
degree. The extent of decreasing for females is lower than for males. The coefficient
of the main interaction is -1.53 for females while it is -2.56 for males. The results
are consistent with the research from Ou and Zhao (2016).
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5.6.4 Robustness Check
In order to ascertain whether the impact on the labour market is due to the higher
expansion reform, we conduct a placebo study. In view of some uncertainty regard-
ing the treatment cohorts, we carry out checks using alternative birth-year cutoffs.
The equation of difference-in-difference is estimated in a “policy off” period as a
placebo test. We use different control and treatment groups. The previous treat-
ment group is the individuals who were born after 1980 which is the earliest age to
go to college after the reform. We use different control and treatment groups where
the control group is defined as those born before 1970 and the treatment group is
defined as those born after 1970. The impact of this policy should be quite small or
insignificant. Table 5.9 reports the results of this robustness check. The coefficients
of the interaction between the increasing number of colleges and those with a college
degree is positive and insignificant. Therefore, it is difficult to observe an impact
of the higher education expansion on the labour markets for the college graduates
from this treatment group.
Table 5.9: Robustness Check
All Male Female
Uni 0.4297*** 0.4026*** 0.4442***
(0.0822) (0.1058) (0.1141)
Uni*policy*∆supply 0.2633 1.0655 0.09221
(1.1112) (1.4878) (1.4532)
policy*∆supply 3.852 2.5102 5.3142
(4.4107) (4.8503) (4.6783)
Observations 5443 2797 2649
Note: Estimated using polled data from CHIP 1995, 2002, 2007
and 2013
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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5.7 Conclusion
In summary, China’s 1999 higher education expansion policy has made remarkable
progress by substantially increasing college places. China is significant as an example
country for examining the correlation between education level and earnings. The role
of higher education has been widely studied in developed and developing countries
recently. In modern societies, completing higher education may enable prospective
careers for individuals and lead to increased earnings. China, as a developing and
transitional country, has experienced higher education expansion reform, with the
number of new college students rising from 1.08 million in 1998 to 6.62 million in
2010. Therefore, an increasing number of higher education students have graduated
from colleges in recent years. The expansion of higher education has seen tertiary
education attract large numbers of college students. Consequently, it is necessary to
examine whether expanding higher education has economic benefits for those who
attended college following this higher education development.
This study examines the causal impact of higher education expansion on the
labour market outcomes for young college graduates and identifies the distribution
of the returns on investment in education through the implementation of a natural
experiment. First, the Mincer-type rates of returns to education for young cohorts
were estimated in the 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 survey years. This study aimed
to compare the extent of returns to education among the pre-expansion cohort and
the post-expansion cohort, and found evidence supporting a significant decrease in
the returns to higher education of young cohorts. Second, another approach quan-
tifies the effects of education expansion on labour market outcomes and identifies
the distribution of returns to education by exploring a natural experiment. It ex-
ploited variation in the intensity of expansion in college numbers across provinces,
and applied a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect of the education
reform. The results also illustrate expansion has negative effects on college grad-
uates’ returns and labour market outcomes. The extent of decreasing for men is
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higher than for women. The increasing supply of higher education graduates has a
profound impact on China’s economic and labour market structures.
This chapter is novel in that it explores the mechanisms behind expansion policy’s
effects, by analysing demographic and socioeconomic consequences for individuals.
A comparison of the returns to higher education can provide useful knowledge for
policymakers regarding the appropriate allocation of higher education resources, and
the effectiveness of education expansion on the labour market. In particular, this
chapter explores regional variation in numbers related to the expansion of colleges
across provinces, and high school cohorts. An attentive examination of returns to
higher education can inform further educational and economic policies.
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Appendix
5.A The Data of CHIP Surveys
Figure 5.7: Map of CHIP Surveys Regions
Note: Map of CHIP Surveys. The darker shaded regions in this map are the provinces in
which the survey has been conducted. The provinces and municipalities under the
Chinese Household Income Project in 1995 survey are: Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning,
Jiangsu, Anhui, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu in 1995.
Chongqing is added in the 2002 survey as a municipality which was separated from
Sichuan Province in 1998. Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan are added in 2007 and
2013.
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Figure 5.8: Return to Education in Urban China
Data Source: Li et al. (2012).
Figure 5.9: Annual Wage of Urban Workers
Data Source: Li et al. (2012).
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5.B Regional Variation
Figure 5.10: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (1)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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Figure 5.11: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (2)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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Figure 5.12: Regional Variation of HE Enrolment and Number of Colleges (3)
(a) (b)
(c)
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
This thesis makes some contributions to the general literature review of the Q-Q
trade-off and the effects of higher education expansion on the educational attain-
ments and the labour market outcomes. In this section, we will not only review the
results and contributions, but also discuss future work.
Chapter 3 presents new evidence on the child quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-
off in China. The one-child policy was announced in 1979 in order to curb the
country’s explosive population growth and increase child welfare. After four years
of strict control, in 1984, local governments introduced a more relaxed policy to
allow for a second child for rural citizens if the first child is a girl. The main
contribution of this chapter is to establish the causal effect of family size on the
quality of children. Second, we use panel data to analyse a longer time period
from 1989 to 2011. The third is the use of a new instrumental variable (IV) for
fertility—local policy relaxation under Chinese birth control. Relaxation is used
as an instrumental variable for the family size in this chapter. Moreover, we add
health as an additional outcome dimension in addition to child school enrolment and
education level, as health has received very little attention in the previous empirical
studies. Our findings indicate that family size has a strong effect on improving
children’s completed years of schooling. However, there is no evidence for the Q-Q
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trade-off when using health as the measure of child quality. One of the reasons is
that a lack of nutrition is not a significant concern in China.
In November 2013, the Chinese government stated that it would further relax
the policy by allowing families to have two children if one of the parents is an only
child. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate whether family size is a vital factor for
children’s outcomes and whether the quantity-quality trade-off still exists. Since 1st
January, 2016, China formally changed the one-child policy to a two-child policy,
i.e., all couples are allowed to have two children. The policy has been relaxed due to
low fertility. When there is more data available, it is necessary to check the impact
of family size on child quality. In addition to education and health outcomes, a
number of studies investigate the behavioural consequences of being an only child,
which is known as “Little Emperor” Syndrome. They find that only children tend to
be self-centred, less cooperative, and less likely to get along with peers. Therefore,
more quality measures can be used in the future
Chapter 4 studies the role of the higher education expansion policy in increas-
ing the equality of higher education opportunities. Since the implementation of the
expansion plan in September 1999, the rate of new students entering tertiary edu-
cation and college graduates kept rising dramatically. China has experienced HE
expansion reform, with the number of new college students rising from 1.08 million
in 1998 to 6.62 million in 2010. The goal of this chapter is to explore the impact of
family background and gender on access to higher education, prior to and following
the higher education expansion policy.
The analysis of this chapter is based on nationally representative data from
the Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS), collected in 2010. Cohort-level analysis
and a difference-in-difference model are used to estimate how the benefits of the
higher education expansion were distributed. The results show that higher edu-
cation expansion has not been equally distributed among people from richer and
poorer backgrounds. The education of parents remains a strong determinant of
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educational outcomes among children following education reform. This indicates
that the expansion policy is beneficial for the students with more highly schooled
parents. Despite the benefits brought on by the expansion system, such as more op-
portunities for accessing tertiary education, these benefits have not been distributed
evenly among families, geographies or gender. The equality of higher education
opportunities remains a difficult task.
Chapter 5 examines the causal impact of higher education expansion policy on
labour market outcomes for young college graduates. Large pooled cross-sectional
datasets are used from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) between 1995
and 2013. The main goal of this chapter is to consider whether the increased supply
of higher education graduates has changed labour market outcomes, and how this
sharp increase in the supply of college graduates has affected the college wage pre-
mium for affected cohorts. First, the Mincer-type rates of returns to education for
young cohorts were estimated in the 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 survey years. This
study aimed to compare the extent of returns to education among the pre-expansion
cohort and the post-expansion cohort and found evidence supporting a significant
decrease in the returns to higher education of young cohorts. Second, another ap-
proach quantifies the effects of education expansion on labour market outcomes
and identifies the distribution of returns to education by exploring a natural ex-
periment. It exploited variation in the intensity of expansion in college numbers
across provinces, and applied a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect
of the education reform. The results also illustrate expansion has a negative effect
on college graduates’ returns and labour market outcomes.
China has witnessed a rapid expansion of higher education in the past several
decades. There is concern that the expansion of higher education may produce an
over-educated population that exceeds the needs of the society. Another concern is
the trade-off between quantity and quality of higher education. From these chapters,
we found the negative effects for college graduates on the labour market. However,
164
we do not have detailed information on which types of institutions these individuals
attended, and thus cannot test whether the negative wage effects are correlated with
the types of institutions attended. Moreover, we suggest that policymakers and
universities could facilitate young college graduates’ successful transition into the
labour market, for example by providing career guidance and counselling programs
to help college students, especially female students, acquire the knowledge and skills
needed to improve their career readiness, encouraging young women to participate in
the labour market, helping college students understand career choices and determine
realistic wage expectations.
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